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Executive summary 
This master thesis seeks to explore the decision-making processes in firms that follow a 
decrease in demand due to an external shock. Specifically, decision-making connected to 
human capital and downsizing in Norwegian firms in the petroleum industry after the 
drop in the oil price in 2014 is explored. The purpose is to understand how the need for 
downsizing is identified and the ensuing selection of whom to lay off, followed by 
examining the execution of the layoff process itself. Further, the thesis wishes to uncover 
how different implications of the oil crisis impact the amount of layoffs in a firm.  
 
The study is of an explorative nature and is based on qualitative data. The empirical 
findings in this study are based on 14 in-depth, semi-structured interviews with decision-
makers in the same amount of firms in the Norwegian oil and gas industry. In addition, 
the firms that were interviewed have previously answered an extensive survey on which 
measures they have taken as a result of the drop in the oil price and findings from this 
are also used.   
 
The conclusion from the research is that perceived negative impacts from the crisis 
combined with the expected length of the downturn for a firm seem to affect decision-
making and the number of layoffs. The decision-making process is also affected by 
several other factors. The experiences of decision-makers are found to have a large 
impact on the decision-making process. Contagion effects through what competitors are 
doing and how the crisis is portrayed in the media is according to the firms not impact 
decisions, but this might be affected by self-serving bias of the interviewed decision-
makers. Prospects of loss and gains for the future are expected to influence the decisions 
made, and this is supported for some firms, but not for others. In addition, motivation of 
remaining employees is found to be of importance to the decision-makers.  
 
The thesis outlines how the decision-process unfolds in the companies interviewed. The 
decision-process is found to include the management team in most firms. Some small 
firms are highly influenced by the CEO, whereas other, more hierarchical firms involve 
middle managers to a large extent. Employees themselves are not involved in the process 
until at the very end.  
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Background 
Since the 1970s the Norwegian economy has been booming, largely due to vast 
exploitation of oil fields in the Norwegian Sea (Eika & Olsen, 2008). In the last year, 
though, a massive drop in the oil price has led to an industry-wide recession, with 
massive layoff schemes and large scale cuts in new investment (Baffes, Stocker, Kose, & 
Ohnsorge, 2015). There have been ups and downs in the golden age of oil in Norway, 
but in the last 20 years overall earnings and expectations for the future have increased, 
and in 2007 oil related industry made up 26 percent of the Norwegian GDP, helped a 
large deal by the high oil price (Eika & Olsen, 2008). 
 
A key driver for growth in the oil industry has been the high oil price. The sudden drop 
in the oil price from at least $105 per barrel over a four-year period to less than $50 in 
June 2014 had an immediate effect on the earnings of the oil companies (Baffes et al., 
2015). Ripples from this event soon started to spread throughout the industry, affecting 
supplying and subcontracting firms.  
 
From the drop in the oil price in 2014 until October 2015, nearly 26.000 jobs in the oil 
and gas industry have disappeared, and expected numbers of total cuts in the industry 
range from 50.000 to 100.000 jobs (Aarø, 2015). In 2014 there were 330.000 people 
employed in petroleum related industry in Norway (Blomgren et al., 2015), which makes 
the impeding cuts a massive blow to the industry. In addition, seeing as there are many 
jobs that are in some way or another connected to the petroleum industry, be it hotels 
and conference centers, auditing and accounting firms, or cleaning and construction 
companies, the repercussions of the crisis can be widespread and grave. It also makes the 
crisis an important factor for the entire Norwegian economy, which makes the theme of 
this thesis relevant and current. The recent forecasts for the oil price are not showing any 
clear signs of increase.  
 
In the graph below the Brent Crude oil price development from 1998 until February 
2015 can be seen (Anderson, 2015). As one can see, there was also a large drop in 
2008/2009, which coincides with the financial crisis that affected much of the world. In 
2014 the dramatic price drop can be seen clearly.  
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The following graph shows the Brent Crude oil development for the last year (from 
December 10th 2014 to December 10th 2015) (Screenshot from dn.no’s oil price index). 
As the graph displays, the trend is still further decreases in the crude oil price. 
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1.2 Research questions 
Strategy literature has only recently started studying what happens with firms’ 
investments during recessions (Knudsen & Lien, 2014b). An ongoing research project at 
the Center of Strategy, Organization and Performance (S T O P) at the Norwegian 
School of Economics (NHH) has been studying how firms’ investment into research and 
development, human capital and capital goods change in recessions. This thesis’ purpose 
is to contribute to this new strain of research by examining which employees are laid off 
in a downturn and how decision-making processes connected to the layoffs unfold. The 
downturn in the Norwegian petroleum industry is thus an opportunity to further develop 
the knowledge on firm behavior in recessions. 
 
This thesis will, by in-depth interview with several Norwegian companies in the oil and 
gas industry, try to answer the following research questions. 
 
1. Who is laid off in a downturn and why are they chosen?  
2. Who is involved in the decision-making process? 
3. How does the decision-making process unfold? 
4. Which factors influence decision-making? 
 
The first question is meant to uncover which type of employee is laid off in a downturn 
and why these are the ones to be cut. The research in this area expects employees with 
low adjustment costs if new hiring becomes necessary to be laid off first, and it is 
investigated whether this rings true for the firms interviewed. The second question is 
aimed to find which persons are involved in the decision-making process when a 
downturn is ongoing. The third question then follows up on the second question, and 
should be answered with how the actual decision process is carried out when it comes to 
time of involvement and degree of influence from different people in the organization. 
The fourth and final question is meant to supplement the second and third questions by 
looking into which factors impact the main decision-makers in the decision-making 
process.  
 
These questions are important to highlight because little research has been done on how 
decision-making processes happen in connection to downsizing after an external shock. 
In total, 14 in-depth interviews with firms in the petroleum industry have been 
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conducted. Additionally, the results build on an extensive survey on the effects of the oil 
crisis that the interviewed firms answered earlier in 2015.  
1.3 Structure  
First previous research and relevant theory on the topics are explored and presented in 
section 2. Following that, the methodology of the study is explained and argued for, and 
weaknesses connected to the method are pointed out in section 3. The fourth section, 
Results, presents the main findings from the in-depth interviews conducted with firms in 
the Norwegian oil and gas industry. After this, the findings that are most interesting for 
the purpose of this thesis are explored and analyzed further in section 5, Analysis. The 
overall findings and results from the study are then summarized in the concluding 
section.  
  
	   11 
2. Theory 
This thesis’ purpose is to look beyond what rational economic theory predicts firm and 
managerial behavior in a downturn will be by pairing it with decision-making theory, 
which is largely built upon the assumption that human behavior is less than rational. The 
theoretical section begins by outlining the economic theory connected to economic 
shocks and reactions within and around firms during such times. It then goes on to 
explore how decision-making has been found to happen within firms, and factors that 
matter in decision-making processes.  
2.1 Strategy: Exploration or exploitation 
All firms need strategy to be able to attract investors, to guide the actions of management 
and employees and to steer the course of the firm (Bowman, 2003). Strategy is important 
because its purpose is to make sense of and adequately (or beyond) compete in the 
competitive landscape (Porter, 2008). An earlier contribution by Porter (1996) states that 
strategy is about being different and performing a specific set of activities in a manner 
that is unique to the firm, creating value for customers.  
 
For the purpose of human capital investments, it is useful to divide strategies into two 
broad types; explorative and exploitative. Using this classification is suitable because 
whether a firm is innovative or traditional is thought to affect their investments in human 
capital (Gupta, Smith, Shalley, & Smith, 2013; Knudsen & Lien, 2015b). This is also done 
because it is expected that within the oil and gas industry, most firms will fall into mainly 
one of these two categories. The two strategies can be understood as follows; exploration 
is exploring new possibilities and exploitation is exploiting old certainties (March, 1991). 
Explorative firms focus on finding or employing new technology or ideas, go into new 
markets or use disruptive business models, whereas exploitative firms use current 
technology and set processes, stick to known markets and traditional business models 
(Gupta et al., 2013).  
 
There is some discordance as to whether firms are either exclusively explorative or 
exploitative, or whether they might be ambidextrous, ie score high on both (Gupta et al., 
2013; Knudsen & Lien, 2015b). This thesis will for simplicity maintain that the two 
strategies are generally separated, assuming that a predominantly explorative firm will 
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have behavior similar to a wholly-explorative firm, and a mainly exploitative firm will 
behave like an exploitation-only firm (Knudsen & Lien, 2015b). 
 
Firms that choose one strategy above the other, do this because they believe this is where 
they most likely will find sustainable competitive advantage. For a competitive advantage 
to be sustainable it needs to be valuable, rare, inimitable and non-substitutable (Barney, 
1991). Competitive advantage can arise from many places; physical or system assets and 
cultural, knowledge or relational resources (Bowman, 2003). Narrowing the focus, one 
can further segment these resources into two major blocks, tradeable and non-tradeable 
assets. Tradable assets are physical assets that can be bought in a market, whereas non-
tradeable assets cannot be bought – for example relational assets such as consumer 
loyalty and knowledge assets such as research and development capabilities (Dierickx & 
Cool, 1989). An important part of assets are human capital resources.  
2.1.1 Human capital resources  
Human capital resources are, as the name suggests, those resources that originate in 
employees in a firm. Human capital resources are knowledge and competences found in 
employees in a firm, and also their skills and ways of working (Coff, 1997; Hatch & Dyer, 
2004). Human capital is unique in its characteristics – employees can leave a company 
and use their knowledge in competing firms, something capital goods cannot do (Coff, 
1997). However, since work and processes in different firms vary, human capital is 
usually not completely transferrable; most employees working in one firm cannot be put 
in another company and provide the exact same return – because some of their 
knowledge is often firm specific (Hatch & Dyer, 2004). An employee can be of more or 
less value in different firms depending on characteristics of the firm, such as its social 
complexity and the environment in the company (Coff, 1997). This mobility and 
difference in return makes human capital resources tradeable, but not completely 
transferrable.  
 
As mentioned, human capital resources are grounded in knowledge. Knowledge can be 
split into two dimensions; (1) codified or tacit and (2) general or firm specific knowledge. 
The first two can be combined with the two latter, which then explains how hard it is to 
transfer knowledge. Codified knowledge is easily transferred between and explained to 
employees. Tacit knowledge is knowledge that is not easily transferred; in fact, people 
might not even know how to do so. General knowledge is not tied to a specific company, 
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whereas firm specific knowledge is just that; specific to the firm – ie it will not be 
immediately useful in a different context. Codified general knowledge is then easy to 
explain and transfer, whereas tacit general knowledge is harder to explain. Codified firm 
specific knowledge is easier to learn than tacit firm specific knowledge (Lecuona & 
Reitzig, 2014).  
 
An important distinction between firms that focus on exploitation and firms that focus 
on exploration is that the latter often requires more firm specific knowledge in their 
employees (Knudsen & Lien, 2015b). As exploitative firms to a large extent build on 
more traditional and well-known processes, markets or products that are widely available 
it is likely that the need for firm specific knowledge is not as high as for explorative firms 
(Gupta et al., 2013; Knudsen & Lien, 2015b). Because its processes are similar to those 
of many other firms, it is intuitive that this type of knowledge can be put to use in several 
firms. This also means that the required type of labor is rather easy to find in a strategic 
factor market since the skills they possess are not highly firm specific. The ease of 
finding such human capital in a labor market depends on additional factors such as 
scarcity of the resource or the required competence. For example, an engineer within a 
specific field might be difficult to replace if there is a scarcity of such engineers, or there 
may be different levels of competence found in engineers within the same field.  
 
Innovation often requires more firm specific skills, and firm specific skills are not readily 
available in the factor market (Hatch & Dyer, 2004). Building firm specific skills requires 
larger training investments in the employees, and the required return from the employees 
is expected to be larger than without these investments (Lepak & Snell, 1999). 
Employees with firm specific knowledge are therefore hypothesized to have higher 
adjustment costs, ie cost of searching, training or replacing an employee, than employees 
with general knowledge (Knudsen & Lien, 2015b).  
2.2 Economic shocks 
We will now look into what economic shocks are, how firms are affected by shocks and 
how investments in human capital change after a shock. An economic shock is a crisis, 
that is, an event that has a low probability, but that has a great impact on the 
sustainability of an organization; that is hard to predict and solve, but necessitates swift 
action when it strikes (Pearson and Claire, 1998; cited in Pollard & Hotho 2006). Crises 
have generally been regarded as adverse events for the affected firm(s). A time of crisis 
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initially has perceived negative consequences, but the long-term effects are often positive 
(Pollard & Hotho, 2006). An economy usually sees a lot of restructuring and efficiency 
increases after a recession (Geroski & Gregg, 1996). Economic shocks can broadly be 
divided into three types; firm specific, industry specific and cross-industry, and into two 
main types of changes; permanent and temporary. An example of a permanent change is 
a technological shock, whereas a temporary shock can be a drop in the price of an 
output, such as crude oil (Knudsen & Lien, 2015b). 
 
The epitomized temporary economic shock is a recession. Recessions are part of the 
business cycle, and are defined by NBER as the period from a peak to a trough, whereas 
an expansion is the period from a trough to a peak in the business cycle (NBER, 2010). 
The business cycle consists of economic fluctuations in activity, from booms to 
recessions. The ups and downs in an industry can be affected by exogenous or 
endogenous factors, such as war, which is external to the industry, and changing 
consumer preferences, which may be industry internal (Mascarenhas & Aaker, 1989). 
Recessions have grave impact on the firms affected, but they also create entrepreneurial 
opportunities and drive innovations (Knudsen & Lien, 2015b). This thesis’ locus is the 
industry specific downturn after the drop in the oil price, and it is assumed that theory on 
economic shocks, downturns and recessions is generally applicable in an industry specific 
downturn as well. 
 
Traditionally, crises studies have been within macroeconomics, ie on an aggregated level, 
where most factors are normally considered homogenous. Macroeconomics deals with 
the economy on a larger scale, which necessitates simplifications of firm specifics. Several 
works within macroeconomics have taken heterogeneity between firms into account, but 
these theories have not gained a whole lot of traction. Even if heterogeneity is taken into 
account, the overarching goal of macroeconomists is to study the aggregate rather than 
exploring differences between firms. Thus the macroeconomic research on economic 
shocks is useful, but does not reveal the entire picture. Research in strategy, however, is 
built on the assumption that all factors are not the same, but that resources are 
heterogeneous. The key phenomenon in the strategy field is the differences between 
firms. Building on findings in strategy literature to gain understanding of reactions to 
recessions and crises is imperative for building better future solutions for firms in a 
downturn (Agarwal, Barney, Foss, & Klein, 2009). Even literature on strategy has not 
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dug deeply into what happens to firms during recessions until recently, though, and it is 
still a vastly unexplored field. With the recent shocks the world has seen, it is becoming 
increasingly clear that recessions matter – their frequency has gone up, and the impact on 
businesses and individuals is still high (Knudsen & Lien, 2014b).  
 
Cutting to the core, recessions are basically adverse changes in the environment. To be 
able to adequately meet and tackle recessions, a firm needs to be susceptive to change 
and initiate necessary steps to keep afloat. Adapting the strategy to face the business 
cycle’s dips and peaks can be seen as a new way of gaining competitive advantage, by 
being able to take advantage of sudden change in the environment (Stensaker and Meyer, 
2011). 
2.2.1 How firms are affected by shocks 
It is not optimal for firms to have a rigid strategy through the troughs and peaks of the 
business cycle; they should adapt the strategy to the environment because of the 
differences in demand and competition in the business cycle. There is empirical evidence 
that firms do adapt their strategy during recessions, and interestingly, it is not always the 
case that firms that were profitable pre-recession are better at handling downturns – they 
might be hit very hard (Geroski & Gregg, 1996; Mascarenhas & Aaker, 1989). When a 
shock hits, firms are likely adversely affected in one or more ways – drop in demand, 
changes in consumer preferences, less access to financing. However, due to the changes 
in the environment, several opportunities may arise as well; talent might be available at 
reduced cost, capital goods might be available at reduced prices and so on (Knudsen & 
Lien, 2015b). It is thus hard to predict which firms are hit hardest by recessions. There 
are however findings that give pointers toward which factors may affect how hard a firm 
is hit by a recession.  
 
Ownership structure has been found to affect how firms tackle recessions. Firms with 
strong ownership, such as family owned companies, are less severely affected that firms 
with more dispersed ownership. Firms with diverse ownership likely have numerous 
investors with low percentages of shares, which makes them less likely to intervene in 
decisions, as their relative influence on decisions is lower, whereas concentrated 
ownership increases the influence of the owner(s) has on decisions. However, these 
results are hard to validate thoroughly, as many of the firms with dispersed ownership are 
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large, and large firms often tackle recessions better (Geroski & Gregg, 1996). The effect 
of ownership is thus somewhat ambiguous.  
 
An important factor in how firms are affected by a downturn is their financial structure. 
Firms with more external financing are hit harder by recessions than those with higher 
access to internal financing (Braun & Larrain, 2005; Campello, 2003; Tong & Wei, 2008). 
Campello (2003) finds that firms that are heavily debt financed perform badly during 
recessions in industries where the majority of firms are internally financed, but concludes 
that in industries where the norm is being heavily leveraged, the same is not seen. Tong 
and Wei (2008) find that firms that have higher external financing before a crisis have a 
bigger drop in the share price during a crisis than those that have more internal leeway 
financially. Firms that are reliant on external financing will face lower willingness to lend 
from financial institutions and higher expected return from investors (Braun & Larrain, 
2005). This means that they may have to focus more on short-term gains to survive, for 
example by selling capital goods, which can hurt long-term performance, ultimately 
making the firm less interesting as an investment object.  
 
Noticeably, firms which rely more on external financing have a higher propensity for 
investing in tangible assets such as capital goods, which especially interesting in our 
context of investments in human capital. Investments in tangible goods facilitate further 
external financing, as tangibility makes it easier to repay investors in case of default 
(Almeida & Campello, 2007). It is then reasonable to believe that firms that have high 
leverage invest less in human capital than their less leveraged counterparts, and that this 
is especially true in a downturn.  
 
A study done in Norway on the aftermath of the recession that started in 2008 found 
that industry characteristics are indicators for how hard a firm is affected by a downturn. 
High share of durable goods and intense prerecession competition in the industry 
indicates a negative impact of a crisis. A high share of capital goods means that the firms’ 
demand drops relatively more in a recession, as consumers put off these purchases in 
tough times. Intense competition prerecession has a negative effect because then the 
margins of the firms are already very slim, and additionally there are many equally good 
options for consumers, so a firm’s product is easily substitutable.  A smaller, but 
significant effect is seen for industries where there is vertical differentiation in price and 
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quality. In such industries, substitution effects draw demand from high quality and high 
price products to lower quality and lower price companies in a downturn, due to a drop 
in the willingness to pay among consumers. Finally, a small effect was seen from industry 
growth before the recession. The higher the industry growth, the higher the probability 
that a firm is adversely affected by the recession (Knudsen & Lien, 2012).  
2.2.2 Human capital investments during downturns 
Util izing s lack in t imes o f  low act iv i ty  
There is a growing literature on how human capital investments play out in recessions. 
When demand drops, the opportunity cost of investing in training of employees is 
lowered; it is both cheaper to use experienced employees as instructors and to give new 
and existing employees training (Knudsen & Lien, 2015b). This is due to increased slack 
in human capital (Knudsen & Lien, 2014a). Slack is excess capacity; when a company has 
more capacity in its resources than is necessary to perform their routine operations, in 
other words that they pay more for the resources they have than what is necessary to 
maintain revenue (Cyert & March, 1963). Keeping employees in the company even when 
there is an increase in slack due to a drop in demand is referred to as labor hoarding 
(Knudsen & Lien, 2014b).  
 
Slack has traditionally been viewed as something that gradually builds in an organization, 
but can just as well arise suddenly from exogenous shocks. Slack is often kept to meet 
fluctuations in demand (Cyert & March, 1963; Lecuona & Reitzig, 2014). Generally, slack 
has been regarded as a negative effect, but can also be positive; excess capacity can 
encourage innovation and development in an organization (Knudsen & Lien, 2015a). 
Whether it is beneficial to reallocate idle labor to development activities depends on the 
expected value that can be created from it (Knudsen & Lien, 2015b). Encouragement of 
innovation and development is possible because of the unique nature of human capital 
slack. What differentiates human capital slack from other kinds of slack is that humans 
possess knowledge, which can be utilized in many contexts, whereas excess capacity in 
capital goods might harder to utilize, eg. machines producing product components 
cannot be easily transferred to other tasks (Lecuona & Reitzig, 2014). Basically, human 
capital is more flexible than machines, and in addition, humans learn, which machines do 
not do to the same extent.   
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To exploit the opportunities that follow excess capacity, though, firms need to believe 
that by investing in human capital in times with slack they will emerge from the 
downturn stronger than before. To be able to make this happen, firms also need to have 
enough financial flexibility to sustain these investments. As such, it is possible that an 
exogenous shock that increases slack like a recession might benefit internal innovation. 
Explorative firms are more likely to invest in training for employees in times of externally 
created slack because they have more firm specific knowledge, as mentioned earlier. This 
higher firm specificity indicates higher adjustment costs from firing and hiring, 
incentivizing explorative firms to hoard labor for a longer time than exploitative firms 
with lower adjustment costs (Knudsen & Lien, 2014b). Noting that learning is 
cumulative, ie the more you know the easier it is to learn more, it is also beneficial to 
exploit a downturn to increase knowledge, especially firm specific knowledge, due to the 
decreased alternative cost from moving employees from their regular tasks. This also 
means that it is beneficial, especially for explorative firms, to hire new labor during a 
downturn, as it is less costly to attract and train them than in an upswing (Knudsen & 
Lien, 2015b).  
 
Whether labor hoarding and investment in training in a downturn is beneficial for a firm 
depends on several factors. If employees will not yield high enough returns of the human 
capital investment needed to make them part of the organization, it is likely that the firm 
will not hire them (Lepak & Snell, 1999). The same can be applied in the context of 
recessions; if the expected return of the employee is lower than the cost of hoarding said 
employee, the firm will not hoard. Several factors impact this proposition. If the drop in 
demand is considered temporary, it might be better for a firm to hoard labor to avoid 
hiring and training costs (Knudsen & Lien, 2015b).  
 
A firm’s expectation for the length of a downturn will affect their propensity to hoard 
labor (Knudsen & Lien, 2014b). Even firms with good financial standing can only defend 
paying salaries to idle employees for a certain period of time. If there is not an 
expectation that the hoarded labor will be needed in the future, it is unlikely that the firm 
will invest in human capital when there is slack in the organization. The longer a 
downturn lasts, the more forgone savings from laying off employees with slack in their 
job. The adjustment costs for hiring new labor when demand picks up will be lower than 
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the cost of hoarding the labor if the downturn lasts beyond a certain point (Knudsen & 
Lien, 2015b). 
Downsizing 
When facing a crisis firms must often turn to downsizing, which is defined as cutting 
costs by reducing the number of employees (Vollmann & Brazas, 1993). Downsizing can 
be done in both beneficial ways and in less ideal manners. Vollmann and Brazas (1993) 
distinguish “rightsizing” from downsizing. Rightsizing is a wanted and beneficial part of 
downsizing – by reducing the organization in a planned way to make it more efficient 
and fine-tuned. Putting this in the context of a downturn, it is possible that firms use the 
threat as an opportunity to cut those employees who are not performing optimally 
(Filipowskaja, Hjartåker, & Nesheim, 2015).  
 
Knudsen and Lien (2015b) hypothesize that firms with explorative strategies will fire 
more employees with general knowledge than exploitative firms because they have higher 
incentives to hoard employees with firm specific knowledge, as this type of knowledge is 
a prerequisite for the exploration strategy. The underlying assumption Knudsen and Lien 
(2015b) make is that firms hold on to their employees with firm specific knowledge 
rather than those with more general skills, and because explorative firms are especially 
dependent on these employees, they have higher incentives to labor hoard. To finance 
this hoarding, firms can fire employees without high firm specific knowledge to save 
costs. This assumption is not tested, and is noted as a cavity in the paper, but seems to be 
reasonable nonetheless. One point to make again here is that differences in level of 
competence are also important here. Firms might want to keep a highly skilled person 
within a non-firm specific position rather than a lower skilled person in a firm specific 
position. However, when choosing between a non-firm specific and firm specific 
employee with the same return, it is likely that the firm specific knowledge is kept longer 
due to higher adjustment costs.  
 
Since resources that are heterogeneous and valuable are often the root of competitive 
advantage (Peteraf, 1993) it is logical that firms want to hold on to their heterogeneous 
resources in rough times. Human resources are especially heterogeneous, and human 
knowledge is near impossible to measure and replicate, due to its uniqueness (Lepak & 
Snell, 1999). Because firm specific knowledge is more heterogeneous than general 
knowledge, it is likely that firms want to keep their firm specific knowledge workers as 
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long as they believe the downturn will pass within reasonable time (Knudsen & Lien, 
2015b). 
 
2.3 Decision-making 
Having considered the rational route for how making decisions on human capital should 
happen in crises, we now try to look into how reality may deviate from economic theory. 
Human beings are not always completely rational, and do not always follow set processes 
for finding a solution. This section will look into decision-making and bounded 
rationality, and other factors that influence a decision-making process. Decisions are 
based on one or more of the three following points; logic, statistics or heuristics 
(Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011).  
2.3.1 Experience-, description- and heuristics-based decision-making 
Decisions based on logic and statistics have generally been regarded as rational methods 
for decision-making (Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011). Logic encompasses facts and 
experience of the decision-maker. Basing decisions on logic and past experiences is called 
experience-based decisions (Kudryavtsev & Pavlodsky, 2012). Basing decisions on 
statistics means that quantitative reasoning is behind the decision, and this is called 
description-based decisions (Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011; Kudryavtsev & Pavlodsky, 
2012). A concept with growing interest in decision-making literature is heuristic decision-
making. Heuristics are the use of prior experience to ignore parts of information to 
quickly, prudently and accurately make decisions than by using more complex models. 
The use of heuristics have often shown more accurate results than more complex 
methods, as the mind intuitively excludes non-viable alternatives (Gigerenzer & 
Gaissmaier, 2011).  
 
Decision-makers who are more seasoned have naturally accumulated more experience on 
how to make tough decisions. This experience is a highly relevant topic when discussing 
decision-making, as prior encounters with a certain type of situation may be transferred 
into the next similar one (Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011). Experience- and description-
based decisions have largely been at the forefront of decision-making models, but 
recently the literature on heuristic decision-making has been growing. Heuristics can be 
valuable because they narrow the scope of a problem by applying existing knowledge, 
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thus overcoming information overload problems, but are problematic in that they may 
lead to biased decisions (Conlisk, 2007).  
 
Since the frequency of recessions has gone up (Knudsen & Lien, 2014b), it is likely that 
decision-makers have encountered similar crisis situations before, which would indicate 
that experiences and also heuristics are used also in these types of decision-making 
situations. Learning how to act in recessions might be of value when assessing the oil 
crisis in light of the recent financial crisis, for example. 
2.3.2 Decision-making in organizations 
In organizations, for a decision to be made it has to be determined who will make the 
decision, and when the decision will be made. Who and when is to be included depends 
on the situation (Selart 2010). According to the rational model, all (or at least as many as 
possible) alternatives should then be considered and evaluated to come to the best 
solution. If all decision-makers were completely rational, all decisions would be optimal 
(Christensen & Knudsen, 2010). The bounds of rationality hinder evaluation of all 
possible solutions, and therefore decision-processes are most often not fully rational 
(Brunsson, 1982). Very broadly, two main types of error can arise when making a 
decision; rejecting a superior alternative or accepting an inferior alternative, both of 
which can be due to bounded rationality or limited resources (Christensen & Knudsen, 
2010). Such a decision can be for example whether to make an investment, whether to go 
into new business areas, or whether to hire a new person. One such decision that a firm 
makes is whether it follows an explorative or exploitative strategy – which in turn will 
affect all future decisions. 
 
Another point to consider when thinking about experience- and description-based 
decision-making is that its basis is making assumptions from past experience – which in a 
fast changing world, increasingly complex and dynamic, may not be optimal (Pollard & 
Hotho, 2006).  
2.3.3 Bounded rationality 
Rationality is a term that in economics usually refers to the maximization of utility for an 
actor, given all information (Jones, 1999). For several reasons decision-making is often 
irrational, even in strategically important decisions, and in fact irrationality might be most 
prevalent in such larger decisions (Brunsson, 1982). Saying that decision-makers are 
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irrational does not convey the full picture, however. Most decision-makers want to make 
rational choices, but are hindered in some way (Jones, 1999). Brunsson (1982) points out 
three traditional, possible explanations for such irrationality in decision-making: first, that 
there is limited cognitive ability in decision-makers, second, that the inherent human 
nature is not rational, and finally that the amount of information, either too little or too 
much, makes it practically hard to make completely rational decisions. When individuals 
are aiming to make rational decisions, but are hindered by these factors, there is bounded 
rationality, a term first coined by Herbert Simon in the mid-20th century (Gigerenzer & 
Selten, 2002). Bounded rationality is then the concept of wanting to act in a rational 
manner, but being limited by cognitive ability or lack of information (Jones, 1999). 
Bounded rationality rests on many pillars – intuition, accessibility of information and 
knowledge, framing of a problem and prior experience (Kahneman, 2003).  
 
However, it is not always optimal to act in a completely rational manner by evaluating all 
possible solutions to a problem. Due to the limited cognitive ability of people, too much 
information might create uncertainty as to which solution is superior: an abundance of 
alternatives evokes uncertainty on which decision will lead to the best actions and results. 
By limiting alternatives, one limits uncertainty, thus reducing lack of commitment and 
motivation (Brunsson, 1982). In addition, the search and processing costs of evaluating 
all possible solutions can quickly surpass the benefit from choosing a slightly more 
optimal alternative; rationality is thus not the same with or without search and processing 
costs. Even what is considered rational decision-making (experience- and description-
based) is not fully rational, because there is always some asymmetry or lack of 
information.  
2.3.4 Strategic decision-making 
Strategic decisions shape a firm’s future decisions and performance. Strategic decision-
making is the process by which the firm makes these decisions (Mintzberg, Raisinghani, 
& Théorêt, 1976; Shrivastava & Grant, 1985). Very generally, a decision-making process 
consists of familiarizing with the problem and building a solution (Shrivastava & Grant, 
1985). To get an overview of how decisions are generally made within organizations, an 
overview of the process is outlined below.  
 
Mintzberg et al (1976) built one of the first empirically grounded models of decision-
making. They found that strategic decision-making process can be broken down into 
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three phases; the identification phase, the development phase, and the selection phase. 
Each of the phases has subroutines which are carried out and that play a part in the 
process. In addition to these phases and their subroutines, there are three supporting 
routines to all the decision-making phases; decision control routines, communication 
routines and political routines. The following paragraphs will briefly outline the different 
phases and routines. 
 
The identification phase is, naturally, when a problem or an opportunity arises, and it 
consists of two routines; decision recognition and diagnosis. In these routines, 
management attempts to weave out the issue and evaluate cause-effect relationships 
connected to it (Mintzberg et al., 1976).  
 
In the development phase, one or several solutions to the issue is developed and 
evaluated. The development phase encompasses two routines: search and design. The 
search routine is typically used when similar decisions have been made before, and their 
solutions can be applied to the current issue. The design routine, conversely, is used 
when the issue at hand is novel and needs a customized solution. Interesting to note here 
is that when the design routine is initialized, companies only fully develop one solution 
due to the amount of resources needed, which necessitates a well-defined issue from the 
identification phase (Mintzberg et al., 1976). This lack of completeness is an important 
aspect of decision-making, as we saw when discussing bounded rationality. There seems 
to be relatively high emphasis on experience and knowledge, and low emphasis on 
managerial models and tools in the development phase when the decision process is 
reliant on a top manager (Shrivastava & Grant, 1985).  
 
Finally, in the selection phase, there are three routines identified: screen, evaluation-
choice, and authorization. Although the selection phase is the final phase of decision-
making, it is often intertwined with the development phase, and the two iterate until a 
final solution is chosen. The screening routine is used to eliminate unfeasible or 
unwanted solutions, and to move forward with the solutions that are considered viable. 
The evaluation-choice routine is then used to select and move forward with an 
alternative. Ultimately, the authorization routine is invoked, whereby the decision-maker 
lifts the decision to a higher level in the organization to get additional resources for 
implementing the decision, if needed (Mintzberg et al., 1976).  
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The three supporting routines (decision-control, communication, political) that engross 
the decision phases play a large part in how the decisions are made and implemented. 
Decision control routines consist of decision planning and switching, ie planning of how 
resources will be delegated to the decision-making process and switching between 
different phases and routines. The communication routine can be split into three; 
exploration, investigation and dissemination. Exploration is when information is 
gathered and assessed at the beginning of a process, investigation is a deeper dive into 
information at different stages in the process, and dissemination is spreading and sharing 
information to gain traction for the solution. This third routine is political, whereby 
stakeholders use bargaining, persuasion and cooptation routines to get their way. Political 
routines play a major part in the interruption and delays of decision processes (Mintzberg 
et al., 1976)  
 
It is important to note that not all decision-making processes function according to this 
framework (Mintzberg et al., 1976), but having a model of how these processes happen is 
useful when assessing how firms initiate and follow through on decision-making.  
 
Having this framework in mind, Shrivastava and Grant (1985) identified four main 
strategic decision-making process models by studying 32 Indian firms. These are the 
Managerial Autocracy Model (MAM), Systemic Bureaucracy Model (SBM), Adaptive 
Planning Model (APM) and Political Expediency Model (PEM). The four are more 
adapted to specific organizational structures, whereas Mintzberg et al.’s framework has a 
broader approach. What is interesting about Shrivastava and Grant’s (1985) framework is 
that it explicitly states how who is making the decisions affects the decisions being made. 
 
The four models can be described very briefly as follows; MAM has one key decision-
maker, usually a manager with lots of authority and leeway. In SBM organizational rules 
and norms are at the heart of the decision process, and external stakeholders are often 
involved. APM builds on long-term strategic plans of the company in the context of a 
specific decision. In PEM, groups of decision-makers form coalitions where they 
advocate their solution and lobby their opinion for the main decision-maker. Which type 
is in use in a company naturally affects which decisions are made and how they are 
implemented (Shrivastava & Grant, 1985).  
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2.3.5 Organizational structure 
From Shrivastava and Grant’s (1985) study it is clear that an organization’s structure 
impacts how decisions are made. Which of the identified decision-making models is 
utilized depends on how the firm is governed, and how power is distributed within the 
organization. When regarding organizations on a spectrum of structure from completely 
hierarchical to polyarchical, ie flat in structure, several implications for how decisions are 
made become apparent (Christensen & Knudsen, 2010).  
 
In a hierarchy the probability of an inferior solution being chosen is lowered due to the 
fact that it has to be approved by several layers of managers. In a polyarchical structure, 
it is less likely that a superior alternative is rejected, as the decision-makers are part of all 
the three phases outlined by Mintzberg et al (1976); the identification, development and 
selection phases. The two types of organizational structures thus counteract the errors 
that can happen in a decision-making process in different ways (Christensen & Knudsen, 
2010). In a hierarchy, a solution can be dropped at any level. In a polyarchy, though, a 
solution can be accepted on any level and be implemented regardless of whether it has 
been rejected by someone else in the organization. As an illustrative example we can 
assume that an idea for a new product is being considered in two firms with three 
decision-makers each. Each decision-maker has a 20 percent chance of accepting the 
product. In the hierarchical firm, the decision has a 0.8 percent chance of being accepted 
(0.2*0.2*0.2 = 0.008). In the polyarchical firm, the decision has a 49 percent chance of 
being accepted (1-(0.8*0.8*0.8) = 0.49). Thus the hierarchy often abandons projects that 
should have been executed, and the polyarchy often accepts projects that should not 
have been executed. Conversely, the hierarchy accepts fewer projects that should have 
been abandoned, and the polyarchy undertakes more projects that should be accepted.  
 
The literature on decision-making is fragmented and often finds new paths that are not 
connected to prior research (Shrivastava & Grant, 1985). Intuitively, this is due to the 
fact that processes within firms differ widely, that firms are structured in very different 
ways, and that many decision-makers ground their solutions in experiences and intuition, 
rather that following strict models.  
2.3.6 Decision-making and layoffs 
One important decision managers face is whether to and whom to lay off in times of 
crises. A downsizing process should start with establishing a method for deciding who 
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can stay and who has to be laid off to make the selection transparent and understandable, 
because this can directly impact the perception of the fairness standard in the 
organization for the retained employees (James & Tang, 1996; Wingate, Thornton, 
McIntyre, & Frame, 2003). The perceived fairness will also impact whether a laid off 
employee will pursue legal actions to object the decision (Wingate et al., 2003). The use 
of performance appraisals as a means of choosing whom to cut from the organization in 
a layoff process is becoming increasingly common. These appraisals can be used as the 
only criterion for layoff, or it can be combined with other criteria such as tenure 
(Schraeder et al., 2006). Performance appraisals that are perceived to be objective can 
increase the impression of fairness among employees.  
 
Norwegian firms are limited in their possibilities to diverge from the Work Environment 
Act, which dictates much of the layoff process. It states that the employee has to be 
included in discussions as early as possible in the process to discuss the grounds for 
notice and selection between different employees (Lovdata, 2015).   
 
A study done on Norwegian firms found and that firms tended to lean on natural 
attrition and early retirements instead of direct layoffs due to cultural dissonance towards 
layoffs (Dahl & Nesheim, 1998). The study also found that the expected impact on the 
firm’s reputation affected how layoff decisions were made, and that avoiding negative 
media attention was deemed crucial by many of the firms interviewed to maintain a good 
reputation, and this affected their decisions regarding layoffs. However, as this was a 
longitudinal study, there seemed to be a shift in the acceptability of resorting to layoffs as 
the intensity of such measures increased due to increasing fluctuations in the business 
cycle (Dahl & Nesheim, 1998).  
 
Another point is worth mentioning when it comes to how decisions on layoffs are made: 
conflicting stakeholder interest. The strength and structure of owners can affect how 
decisions on downsizing are made. Owners might have different aspirations than 
employees, and this can have an impact on how processes in a downturn are conducted; 
owners want higher returns whereas employees want job security, for example (Dahl & 
Nesheim, 1998). Decision-makers will have to balance such conflicting interests.  
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2.3.7 Motivation of survivors 
In a period of downsizing issues regarding motivation and feelings of security among the 
remaining employees inevitably arise (Schraeder et al., 2006). If the downsizing process is 
carried out in a way that makes the remaining employees unsure of whether they are next 
to be cut, the anxiety can decrease job performance (James & Tang, 1996). Being 
transparent in the selection of who is laid off and why they were chosen, in addition to 
being open on the situation of the firm can ease the insecurity in layoff survivors, 
according to James and Tang (1996), and thus maintain job performance.  
 
Survivors of downsizing processes pay close attention to how the process unfolds, and 
how management proceeds in these situations will have an impact on the remaining 
employees’ perception of the organization (James & Tang, 1996). Using performance 
appraisals as a tool for choosing whom to lay off should minimize the effect of job 
insecurity with remaining employees assuming the appraisal is objective and fair. One 
issue with such appraisals is that they are done by humans, and therefore cannot be 
entirely objective (Schraeder et al., 2006). 
 
For a firm to perform well compared to other firms it is impervious that they keep 
turnover low, as firms with high turnover perform significantly worse than those with 
higher retention rates (Hatch & Dyer, 2004). This is connected to the costs of training 
new employees, as frequent changing of employees will lead to fewer paid hours spent on 
revenue attaining activities. Additionally, Hatch and Dyer (2004) find that in high 
turnover companies, defect goods are more common than in companies with lower 
turnover, due to tenured engineers to create continuously training new employees and 
fixing their mistakes. Whether it is high turnover that affects motivation or low 
motivation that leads to high turnover can be debated, but it is clear that the two impact 
each other. Firm that downsize may have problems with low motivation in remaining 
employees, which may lead to higher turnover (Gilliland & Schepers, 2003). For a firm 
that initially does not have problems with turnover or motivation, downsizing due to an 
external shock might lead to lower motivation in remaining employees, which in turn can 
lead to higher turnover, initiating the vicious circle of low performance explained above. 
 
Tying motivation and turnover together should then logically be highly important in a 
downsizing process – the people who are kept in the organization are proportionally 
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more important. If an employee has the impression that he has less job security than 
before, there is evidence that organizational commitment decreases, stress level increases 
and that the probability of high turnover for those employees the organization wanted to 
keep increases (Schraeder et al., 2006). A strategically sound downsizing plan might then 
be disrupted by human factors in the organization if employees do not perceive it as fair.  
2.3.8 Prospect theory 
An interesting point to consider is how the risk of choosing the wrong solution to a 
problem affects how a decision is made. Prospect theory, developed by Kahneman and 
Tversky (1979) examines differences in risk aversion when it comes to gains and losses. 
They find that people underweight outcomes that might be obtained with probability X 
compared to outcomes that are obtained with certainty, that they do not base their 
decisions on the expected outcome. This is a stark contrast to the rational economic 
models with perfectly rational individuals, but in line with the previously explored 
bounded rationality.  
 
 For example, if a person has the opportunity to win $100 with certainty or $200 with a 
probability of 90 percent, many will choose the certain alternative even though the 
expected value of the second alternative is higher ($180). However, when the situation is 
flipped and the situations deals with the certain loss of $100 or a $200 loss with a 
probability of 90 percent, many who would choose the certain alternative in the first 
situation would now choose the risky alternative with an expected loss value of $180. 
Thus, prospect theory states that when there is high probability of the risky alternative 
people are risk seeking in choices in the domain of loss and risk averse when the choice 
is in the domain of gains. If, however, the risky alternative has a low probability, people 
become risk seeking in the domain of gain and risk averse in the domain of loss. A 5 
percent chance to win $1000 or a certain win of $55 leads to the person choosing the 
risky alternative with an expected outcome of $50, and conversely the $55 loss is 
preferred before the 5 percent probability of a $1000 loss (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).  
 
Table 1: Summary Prospect Theory 
 Gains Losses 
High probability Risk averse: chooses to win $100 rather than 
$200x50% ($180) 
Risk seeking: chooses to lose 
$200x50% ($180) rather than $100 
Low probability Risk seeking: chooses to win $1000x5% ($50) 
rather than $55 
Risk averse: chooses to lose $55 
rather than $1000x5% ($50) 
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Combining human capital investments and prospect theory, it is useful to expand on 
whether managers perceive themselves to be in a domain of loss or a domain of gain. If 
downsizing in downturn is perceived as being in the domain of loss with low probability, 
there should be more layoffs than if downsizing in a downturn is considered to be in the 
domain of gain. Put bluntly, if you downsize because you believe that otherwise you will 
go bankrupt, you are in the domain of loss, and will probably downsize more. If you are 
downsizing because you see an opportunity for gain, ie rightsizing, you will downsize less 
because you are more risk averse than risk seeking. 
2.3.9 Contagion effects and herd behavior 
In changing environments, how others react and act can influence how people perceive a 
situation and how they consequently make decisions (Barsade, 2002; Palley, 1995; 
Scharfstein & Stein, 1990). This type of behavior is captured in two different paths in 
organizational behavior; contagion effects and herd behavior. Contagion effects have an 
impact on how a situation is perceived and thereafter acted upon within decision-making 
teams (Barsade, 2002), while herd behavior revolves around following what other actors 
in the environment without necessarily having personal contact with them (Palley, 1995; 
Scharfstein & Stein, 1990). 
 
The behavioral attitudes of one person or group can influence other people or groups. 
This type of emotional contagion is called the ripple effect (Barsade, 2002). In firms, just 
like water that ripples from the point where it has been disturbed, one person’s actions 
and feelings can affect other people’s perception of reality. A negative outlook on the 
future from one key decision-maker may affect others’ perception of the future state, 
even if they had a positive perception initially, and vice versa. Barsade (2002) finds that 
negative and positive contagions have an equal affect on the mood of a group (however, 
it should be noted that the two were not tested in a single group to see which is 
dominant). Traditionally, emotional contagion has been thought to happen through 
interaction between humans, that is, by words, tone of voice, body language and so on 
(Hatfield, Cacioppo, & Rapson, 1994). New, experimental research has found that 
emotional contagion can spread without direct interpersonal contact, for example 
through social media or news papers (Guillory, Hancock, & Kramer, 2014). It is then 
likely that firms’ decision-making also is affected by what other firms are doing, and how 
that is portrayed in the media and through social networks, constituting a form of ripple 
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effect. This is an especially interesting point when dealing with a recession or a wide-
spread shock, as the media coverage often is extensive and negative (eg. Aarø, 2015; 
Skjetne, 2015). 
 
Herd behavior is a well-known effect that has been extensively researched in financial 
market behavior literature, and is an effect that is seen when people do not want to go 
against the grain, even if they have information that indicates that the masses have it 
wrong. As managers are often remunerated on their relative performance, they may 
disregard information that would indicate not mimicking the general trend in the market, 
because the repercussions if an individual decision goes south are generally much harder 
than if there is a general drop in performance across the board (Scharfstein & Stein, 
1990). An example of this is that a manager may reject an investment decision although 
he has information on its positive expected value, because someone else has rejected it 
previously (Scharfstein & Stein, 1990).  
 
One can imagine interesting interactions when thinking of prospect theory, contagion 
effects and herd behavior. Real life outcomes have less certain probability distributions 
than the stylized examples from the lab, and managers have less accurate outcomes from 
their choices, making it harder to assess prospects. The contagion effects that might arise 
can affect the perceived probabilities of outcomes, affecting the perceived probability of 
loss or gain for the manager. Herd behavior can also influence the perceived probability 
of loss or gain, or at least the backlash from loss can be considered diminished when 
following the herd, lessening the prospect of loss. 
 
Connecting these factors to human capital investments in recessions, it can be 
hypothesized that firms start downsizing due to other firms’ actions. Additionally, the 
picture painted in the media on the crisis can affect perceptions on the crisis and impact 
decision-making.  
2.4 Summary of theoretical section  
This theoretical section has summarized previous research and combined different 
strains of literature to create a backdrop for the rest of the thesis. The theories explored 
here will be tested empirically in in-depth interviews and analyzed in section 5.  
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First, two different types of strategies were defined; exploration and exploitation. Then, 
human capital resources were defined and different kinds of knowledge within human 
capital resources were explored. Following that came a section on what economic shocks 
are and how they affect firms, including how shocks affect investments in human capital. 
This was built on theory that regards firms as rational economic actors. The next section 
challenges the rational view and looks as theory that expects actors to be less-than-
rational. Decision-making in organizations is explored both in how the process is 
expected to be and by looking at what factors are expected to affect decision-makers. 
Factors covered beyond the decision-makers experience, heuristic knowledge and the 
statistical facts are motivation of the remaining employees, prospects for the future, 
contagion from the environment and tendencies to follow the herd.  
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3. Methodology 
3.1 Research design 
The starting point of this thesis was to build on an extensive survey on changes in human 
capital investments due to the drop in the oil price. The survey had recently been 
distributed to 1312 companies in the oil and gas industry in Norway, and was answered 
by 266 companies. The idea was to now dig deeper, beyond the quantifiable; number of 
employees, layoffs and so on, and try to look further into how the process actually 
happens within the company when decisions are made in this type of environment. Such 
a study is explorative, that is, it seeks to uncover new insights into a phenomenon 
(Saunders, Lewis, & Thornhill, 2009).  
 
Data collection can be done inductively or deductively. Inductive data are collected and 
subsequently theory is built, while deductive data collecting grounds the research in 
previous theoretical works and building on that (Saunders et al., 2009). This thesis is 
deductive in that it thoroughly reviews theoretical contributions, aiming to make new 
connections in established constructs.  
3.1.1 Method 
Methodically, one can choose between a qualitative and a quantitative outset. 
Quantitative data are collected in a standardized way, often through surveys or 
experiments, in which meaning is attributed to the results from the aggregated data. 
Qualitative data are data that have not been quantified and that cannot be immediately 
transcribed as numerical values, or that might not be assigned meaningfulness through 
being quantified (Saunders et al., 2009). Qualitative data are often collected through 
individual interviews, focus groups or by observing the phenomenon in question. By 
using a qualitative approach, several points that would not have been even considered 
when creating a quantitative approach might arise, shedding light on new and interesting 
aspects of the real world (Miles & Huberman, 1994).  
 
The survey this thesis builds on gathered quantitative data, which are very useful for 
studying effects in scale, but can miss out on small nuances of what happens in smaller 
environments. When it is necessary to understand the reasoning behind why decisions 
have been made, qualitative interviews are an invaluable method (Saunders et al., 2009). 
It was therefore decided that carrying out a qualitative study was the best approach to fill 
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in the gaps in how the decision processes in times of crises are carried out. Considering 
the scattered research on how decision-making happens, capturing the processes 
quantitatively seems an unlikely feat. However, one must be mindful of bias that might 
interfere with the quality of the results. For example, researcher or observer bias impact 
how the results from a qualitative study are interpreted, which may lead to over- or 
underemphasizing of certain points (Miles & Huberman, 1994).  
 
3.2 Data collection 
When carrying out research, several types of data sources can be used. Primary data is 
data that is collected specifically for a research project. Secondary data is data that is not 
specifically gathered for the project, but that can be applied in a meaningful manner for 
the purpose of the project. By using and combining these two types of data, a researcher 
triangulates the data to deduct meaningful conclusions (Saunders et al., 2009).  
 
The data used in this thesis is both primary and secondary. The primary data gathered 
during interviews are the primary source for illuminating the research questions, whereas 
the secondary data, the previously collected data from the survey and other supporting 
articles and sources, form the frame in which the data are analyzed. By triangulating all 
these different data sources, the hope is that the final product can provide valuable 
insight. The results of research will inevitably be affected by the ways in which it is 
carried out, but using different forms of data can diminish the problems arising from this 
(Saunders et al., 2009).   
3.2.1 Interviews 
A common way of collecting qualitative data is through interviews. Interviews are useful 
when trying to find answers to questions that are complex and open-ended, and that 
cannot be easily quantifiable. In-depth interviews are recommended when the 
progression of the interviews needs to be varied, when there is a need to probe further 
into what the interview subject is saying, and when personal contact will enable deeper 
questioning and answers (Saunders et al., 2009). Establishing personal contact is 
paramount for getting the answers needed in an interview setting (Yin, 2009).  
 
A semi-structured interview style was selected for this thesis. This was done because 
semi-structured interviews lets the interviewer guide the interview with overall themes, 
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but lets the flow of the conversation lead the way. This means that the questions are not 
necessarily answered in the same order, but should all be touched upon. By letting the 
conversation lead the questions rather than the questions leading the conversation, the 
flow of the interview is often better. Semi-structured interviews demand focus from the 
interviewer, as there is a need to summarize and clarify what the subject is saying, to 
make sure that the answer is understood (Saunders et al., 2009).  
 
The gathering of primary data for this thesis then happened through in-depth interviews 
with six companies within four days in October and November. Each interview lasted 
from 50 minutes to 1.5 hours. In addition, transcripts from eight other interviews carried 
out by two other students with the same interview guide were used.  
3.2.2 Potential problems with in-depth interviews 
When conducting interviews, reliability issues may arise. Reliability issues might be due to 
interviewer bias, that is, the way the interviewer’s behavior affects how the respondent 
answers, and also how the interviewer interprets the answers when repeating or following 
up on them. Related to this is the interviewee bias, where interviewee’s impressions of 
the interviewer might dictate how the responses are given (Saunders et al., 2009). When 
conducting the interviews, I wore neutral clothing and clearly presented myself as a 
student, so that the other person would feel comfortable with my intentions and feel at 
ease.  
 
Many subjects might feel vulnerable or exposed in an interview setting, especially when 
the interviewer tries to probe into areas that the interviewer is hesitant about discussing. 
This is especially true in situations where the interviewer is probing for confidential or 
sensitive information (Saunders et al., 2009). This was tried counteracted by expressing to 
the interviewees that their answers would be treated with complete confidentiality and 
would be anonymous in all written forms. In addition, all the interviews were started by 
an introduction of the purpose of the study and of myself, followed by a question about 
the interviewee. The intention behind this was to build trust between the interviewee and 
I, and to get the conversation flowing naturally. By assuming a neutral tone of voice and 
posture during the interview, I tried to diminish any bias I might project onto the 
interviewee. In fact, the impression I got from the interviews was that the interviewee 
was eager to talk about their experiences in a context where their utterings would be kept 
confidential.  
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Bias may not only be connected to the perception of the interviewer, but also to the 
interview setting itself (Saunders et al., 2009). By having the interviews in the offices of 
the company, the latter effect was hoped counteracted. It is however a possibility that the 
interviewee feels uncomfortable talking about layoffs of colleagues and employees in a 
setting where they normally interact, but as all the interviews were held in closed rooms, 
this is not seen as a big issue. In one instance, where there was a possibility of others 
overhearing what was said, the interviewee noticeably lowered her voice when talking 
about layoffs.  
 
Another issue with in-depth interviews is that they have limited validity for predicting 
results over a larger population, as they cannot be said to be representative. In addition, 
when a semi-structured form is chosen, it can be hard to be certain of the reliability of 
the data, considering the lack of standardization that is inherent in this type of interview 
(Saunders et al., 2009). Starting all the interviews in the same manner, and guiding them 
into all of the overarching themes that were in the interview guide, even if the order of 
the questions did not always the same, hopefully prevented this. The questions were 
mostly posed in an open-ended manner, except when there was clarification needed from 
my side.  
3.2.3 Sampling 
Sampling is an important part of a any research process. Who you choose to interview 
sets the boundaries for the conclusions you can draw, and therefore needs to be given 
thorough consideration (Miles & Huberman, 1994). To choose which firms to interview 
for this thesis, several criteria were set. The firms needed to be in the oil and gas industry 
in Norway, as this industry is now in a downturn, making it interesting to use their 
experiences to check whether the theoretical backdrop can be empirically substantiated. 
As mentioned, a survey conducted some months ago for another thesis was the baseline 
for which companies to contact. By having this survey already filled out by heaps of 
companies, the interviews conducted now could be more straight to the point, as a lot of 
questions had already been answered. However, by choosing to build the interview guide 
on the assumption that a lot of questions were already answered, the amount of 
companies that could be approached was decreased. This decision nonetheless was made 
because of the large additional amount of information available on the companies.  
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When this approach had been chosen, additional criteria for which companies to contact 
were set. For example, it was deemed interesting to see whether there were differences in 
the decision-making processes in internationally owned versus locally owned companies. 
In addition, the size of the company was thought to have some impact on the decision 
processes. Finally, the self-evaluated degree of innovativeness was also set as a criterion, 
as there was a wish to check whether the type of strategy (explorative/exploitative) 
matters when it comes to downturns and decision-making.  
 
The criteria led to the selection of 32 companies that fit the desired descriptions. Due to 
time constraints and logistical issues, not all of them could be interviewed. In a day it can 
be hard to find the time to conduct more than a couple interviews, considering 
scheduling, travel time between interview locations and maintaining concentration for 
the interviewer. Additionally transcribing an hour long interview can take up to 10 hours, 
which has to be accounted for in the planning phase for interviews (Saunders et al., 
2009). Lastly, there may be limited added value from interviewing more than a certain 
amount of firms, and this was something I experienced when asking certain questions in 
the interview process. In total, a little less than half of the sample firms were interviewed.  
 
Keeping in mind that the focal point of this thesis is how strategic decision-making is 
done in a downturn, it was important to interview those people in an organization that 
have an influence over, or at least in-depth knowledge of how such decisions are made in 
the company. It was therefore decided to contact chief executive officers (CEO) and if 
they were not available, then the heads of human resources (HR). The initial contact was 
done by phone, as it was deemed easier to get the attention of the company by calling 
rather than sending an email. During the call, a brief explanation of the purpose of the 
interview was provided. If attendance was confirmed right away, a date and a time was 
set immediately, if not, some suggested times were sent by email after the call. When the 
time had been confirmed, a calendar invite was sent to the participant’s email, to make 
sure that the appointment was not forgotten. The email can be found in the appendix.  
 
A problem that might arise when conducting research by interviews is that there might 
be a biased sample that agrees to be interviewed. Interviews are time-consuming, and 
some people that might give valuable insights might not be readily willing to spend time 
on interviews (Saunders et al., 2009). However, this bias is hopefully overcome by the 
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careful selection of the companies of the sample. Only one of the companies where the 
wanted interview subject was communicated with turned down the request for an 
interview, and this company was similar to many of the others that were interviewed in 
its characteristics.  
3.2.4 Interview preparation and execution 
Interview guide 
Initially, the focus of this work was mainly secondary sources and theoretically significant 
work, which would lead to the creation of an interview guide. An interview guide is 
meant to list the topics that you are to cover during an interview and to guide the 
interview so that the data collected from the different interviewees follow similar paths. 
In addition, an interview guide is useful when you know the topics you want to cover, as 
an interview without a structure can lead to too much superfluous information being 
covered (Miles & Huberman, 1994). The interview guide used was created in 
collaboration with another group of students and our supervisors, Lasse Lien and Eirik 
Knudsen. Initially, the two groups created a set of questions each tied to the theoretical 
backbone of the two theses. The interview guides were sent to contacts in the oil and gas 
industry for feedback. The two sets were then checked for similarities and differences. 
Subsequently, a final interview guide was created in a meeting with Lien and Knudsen 
and the two groups of students.  
 
For semi-structured interviews having such a guide is useful for checking that the 
conversation does not go too far off topic and to make sure that important aspects are 
not forgotten (Saunders et al., 2009). To ensure that the data gathered from the 
interviews is relevant and valuable, it was important to first explore current theory on 
decision-making in downturns. Since the concepts that are studied in this thesis were 
predefined in the theoretical part, and since the thesis is mostly deductive, prior 
instrumentation of the interview structure is useful (Miles & Huberman, 1994). Bearing 
this in mind, it was taken into account that certain things need not be answered due to 
the survey that already had been filled out by the company. This saved valuable time 
during the interviews, as they could move quickly toward the core of the information 
that was to be collected. The interview guide can be found in the appendix. 
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Interview setting 
As mentioned, the interviews begun with me explaining the purpose of the study, 
ensuring the confidentiality of the answers, and then the subject talking about his or her 
background. When the first pleasantries were undergone trust had hopefully been built 
between the subject and I, making it easier for the interviewee to answer the tougher 
questions in the interview truthfully. The interview guide was built with this mechanism 
specifically in mind.  
 
The interviews I conducted were all done face-to-face in Bergen and Oslo, in the 
companies’ offices. Before the interviews started, the interviewee was informed of the 
confidentiality of their answers and that the company would be anonymous in the thesis. 
The general impression I got from the interviewees was that they appreciated being able 
to talk to someone outside of the organization about the good and the bad of crises and 
layoffs. They seemed willing to share their experiences, and there were no questions that 
were expressively asked to not be answered. In a few instances the interviewee expressed 
uncertainty as to whether they could answer the question with their knowledge, but still 
gave an adequate answer.  
 
Out of the 14 interviews, I conducted six and two other students conducted the 
remaining eight. Since different people carried out the interviews that provide the data 
foundations for this thesis, there might be some differences in the ways the interviews 
were carried out and the bias that might have arisen from the interviewee. This type of 
error is called observer error, and arises when questions are posed in different ways, 
which may lead to the answers being answered on different grounds (Saunders et al., 
2009). Hopefully using a common interview guide minimized this effect.  
 
3.3 Data analysis 
3.3.1 Data preparation 
All interviews were recorded after obtaining consent from the interviewee, and 
subsequently transcribed in the days after the interview was conducted. The interviews 
were transcribed verbatim to ensure the context of the answers was taken into account 
for the analysis, although filler words and what might be called listening sounds were not 
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included for readability. When the transcription was done, the interviews were shared 
with the collaborating student group.  
3.3.2 Data analysis 
To get an overview of the data, it is smart to summarize it to condense the most 
important data (or what is considered most important) (Saunders et al., 2009). I 
summarized all interviews to approximately two pages, trying to extract the parts I felt 
were most crucial to the thesis. This proved very beneficial since most of the transcripts 
were over 15 pages, making it much easier to get a proper overview of the interview. 
After this, I started gathering the data in a spreadsheet to easier compare what the 
different firms answered in the interviews. By doing this I gained a very good overview 
of the data. Subsequently, I started coding the data. When qualitative data are to be 
analyzed, coding of the data is frequently used (Saunders et al., 2009). Coding of 
quantitative data is very useful when trying to see patterns and themes that are recurrent 
in the data to make broader assumptions, or to see differences in how participants 
respond to a certain questions (Miles, Huberman, & Saldana, 2014). 
 
Miles and Huberman (1984) highlight several different ways of coding data; on the one 
hand deductively by using the research questions, theoretical background, and other 
hypotheses, and on the other hand by inductively by assigning codes to the concepts and 
contexts. A combined approach is also mentioned as useful for coding the data, where a 
certain set of codes is created before coding and concurrently revised as the coding 
progresses. This is the method that has been used to codify the interviews conducted for 
this thesis, as it was the most convenient and fruitful one. Revisiting is a necessary part of 
coding, as the subject that come up during the interviews are never exactly what was 
expected (Miles & Huberman, 1994). Codes were added or adjusted as the coding 
process evolved.  
 
3.4 Research Quality 
There are several issues of quality of the research conducted by in-depth, semi-structured 
interviews that have to be addressed when analyzing the data. These are usually 
considered to be connected to the reliability and validity of the data and the different 
forms of bias that might arise in and after the interviews (Saunders et al., 2009). 
However, since validity and reliability are concepts that are constructed for quantitative 
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research, it is useful to expand and tweak the concepts a little (Miles et al., 2014; Saunders 
et al., 2009). Miles et al (1994) formed a framework more suited for qualitative research 
and its trustworthiness. They define five issues concerning the trustworthiness of 
qualitative work; objectivity/confirmability, reliability/dependability, 
credibility/authenticity, transferability/fittingness and utilization/application. These 
constructs form the overall credibility of the research. Credibility is the degree to which 
the data are reliable and whether the analysis is trustworthy (Saunders et al., 2009).  
3.4.1 Objectivity/Confirmability 
The confirmability of the data is affected by the biases that are inherent in the person 
gathering the data, which then is a reflection of the objectivity of the interviewer (Miles 
et al., 2014). This has hopefully been counteracted by producing a transparent results 
section, and by thorough explanations of the procedures for the interviews.  
3.4.2 Reliability/dependability 
Reliability/dependability is whether the techniques used for collecting will provide 
consistent answers that can be replicated should another perform the same procedure at 
another occasion (Miles & Huberman, 1994). It is also of importance that there is 
transparency in how the results are found from the raw data. Threats to reliability are 
participant and observer biases and observer error, which have been covered earlier. 
Additionally, participant error, when respondents say what they think their superiors 
want them to say, can affect reliability (Saunders et al., 2009). The results from the 
interviews conducted are summarized as transparently as possible in section 4, Results, 
without compromising on the respondents’ anonymity.  
 
Another aspect of this is whether the way of collecting data is consistent and stable both 
over time and across researchers. This means, for example, that the research questions 
have to be clear, the data collection process is described transparently, there is 
congruency between data collection among the researchers, and that data quality checks 
have been made (Miles et al., 2014). The data quality check refers to checking for bias, 
reliability issues and generalizability issues, and this has widely been discussed earlier in 
the methodology section.  
3.4.3 Credibility/authenticity 
The credibility or authenticity of the data refers to whether data seem credible and 
authentic, fittingly enough. This means that the results should make sense to the reader, 
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that results gathered from the triangulation of data are coherent, and that the data are 
connected to prior research in a fitting way (Miles & Huberman, 1994). The purpose of 
this thesis is to build on previous theoretical findings and connect different strains of 
research to the interview material collected. Hopefully the results will be a coherent and 
valuable contribution to the field.  
3.4.4 Transferability/fittingness 
Transferability of the data is the degree of generalizability of the collected data; whether 
it can be applied to a wider set of cases (Saunders et al., 2009). By interpreting the data 
and seeing patterns the researcher can uncover transferability. For qualitative studies, the 
characteristics of the sample and the results from the research need to be clear and 
understandable. It is valuable to be able to draw connections to extant theory, as this 
helps confirm the transferability. Ideally, the findings have been or could be replicated in 
another study to check for its robustness (Miles et al., 2014). Here there is an issue in this 
research, because of the sensitivity of the data collected the people interviewed need to 
be anonymous, which necessitates their characteristics remain largely hidden. This means 
that the results cannot be directly replicated. By making the sampling criteria and the 
recounts of the results as clear as possible, the transferability issue is tried counteracted.  
3.4.5 Utilization/Application  
The final issue that arises is whether the study is useful for others (Miles & Huberman, 
1994). As this thesis is part of an ongoing research project at S T O P at NHH, the 
results will be valuable to that cause. Utilization also refers to ethics (Miles & Huberman, 
1994), which will be discussed in the next section.  
3.5 Ethical considerations 
When conducting interviews it is important to maintain an ethical approach toward the 
interview subjects and toward the storing of the data collected. The subjects were first 
contacted by telephone, where a brief description of the project was presented and the 
interview time determined. Following this, an email with more information on the 
project was sent to the person, reemphasizing the confidentiality of the interviews and 
that they would be anonymous in the final thesis.  
 
It is important to save transcribed documents in a manner that keeps the information 
anonymous, while still making sure that the researcher knows which interviews the 
documents contain (Saunders et al., 2009). The transcribed documents were made 
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completely anonymous and the document identifying the companies was kept separately, 
to ensure that the integrity of the data was kept intact. The recordings of the interviews 
were deleted when the transcription was finished. 
3.6 Weaknesses of this study 
As two groups with slightly different projects gathered the data, a certain skewedness can 
be seen in the focal points of the interviews. Although the interview guide used was the 
same, there is not time to cover all questions in the interview setting. When I 
interviewed, I would try to cover the themes I found most interesting for my thesis, 
whereas it is clear that the other interviewers have focused on the part they find most 
interesting for theirs. These differences are noticeable, but are possible to overcome. 
Where there is lack of data for some themes from certain interviews, the information has 
either been searched for in the survey results, or that interview was not considered for 
that specific theme.  
 
There might also be issues of the subject not being completely truthful in their answers, 
or that they are telling only parts of the truth, either because of bounded rationality, 
misgivings on the purpose of the study or self-serving bias in the interviewee. I did not 
pick up on any indicators that this might be the case in the interviews I conducted, but as 
I only have transcripts of the interviews the two other students administered, it is 
impossible to accurately say whether falsifications happened in these.  
 
Sometimes the results from the survey and the results from the interviews are used 
together. This may lead to some skewedness in the analysis, as the survey was answered 
up to six months before the interviews were conducted. For example, a firm that said it 
was moderately negatively affected by the crisis in the survey now has much larger 
problems. However, this is not the case for most of the firms, so it not considered a big 
issue. The possibility to examine the situation at two points in time is rather considered a 
valuable addition to the analysis.  	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4. Results 
The interviews provide preliminary results for the research. These are presented here. 
The results build primarily on the information given in the interviews and in some 
instances on results from the survey referenced earlier. The structure of this chapter is 
similar to that of the interview guide. The results for the 14 firms are condensed where 
possible. Some quotes and individual statements are inserted where appropriate. Where 
found important, tables of what has been done in the different firms are presented.  
 
The Results section has been grouped according to the overarching themes explored in 
the interviews and is split into four parts; about interviewee, internal situation, external 
environment, and decision-processes. The first part is a brief introduction of the people 
interviewed, plus the overall strategic orientation of the firms. In the internal section, the 
internal situation of the companies are outlined; business strategy, structure, number of 
layoffs, reallocations and effects of previous crises. The next section on the external 
environment encompasses the power balance in the market and the effect of media and 
labor unions on the companies. The final part is dedicated to decision processes. The 
internal and external environment touch upon some things that have to do with the 
decision-making process, but this is mostly kept to the final part. The results that are 
most relevant for the research questions of this thesis are mentioned in the Results 
section, but only briefly so. These are explored further in the Analysis section.  
 
4.1 About company and subjects 
The firms have been characterized as small if they have less than 50 employees, mid-
sized are those firms with 50 to 300 employees and large firms are those that have more 
than 300 employees. Following this characterization, four firms interviewed are small, 
seven firms are mid-sized and three are large. For simplicity the identified strategy of the 
companies is included in Table 2. The classification of strategy is discussed more in the 
coming Internal part. 
 
The people interviewed were mainly those with human resource decision power, to a 
larger or smaller extent. Most were CEOs or HR directors (with varying job titles). In 
some instances, especially in smaller firms, the person interviewed was responsible for 
HR, but this was not their only job. Typically they were combined HR responsible and 
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chief of administration or doing other administrative tasks. It turned out that speaking to 
the HR responsible was especially valuable, as they were both part of the decision 
process, but also were closely connected to the direct layoff process. Below the 
characteristics of the subjects are listed. The ones that are in charge of HR, but also have 
responsibility areas outside of HR are listed as HR responsible. 
 
Table 2: Company and subjects 
Company Business model  Subject Tenure in 
company 
1 – large Exploitation   HR director 5 years 
2 – small Exploration CEO and owner 15 years 
3 – mid-sized Exploitation CEO 2 years 
4 - mid-sized Exploitation HR responsible 7 years 
5 - small Exploitation HR responsible 8 years 
6 – small Exploration Owner, previously CEO  19 years 
7 – small Exploration HR responsible 1 year 
8 – large  Exploitation HR director 4 years 
9 – mid-sized Exploration  HR responsible  3 years 
10 – mid-sized Exploitation HR responsible 8 years 
11 – mid-sized Exploration  HR manager 12 years 
12 – mid-sized Exploitation HR responsible 3 years 
13 – mid-sized Exploitation HR director 6 years 
14 - large Exploitation HR director 1 year 
 
4.2 Internal 
4.2.1 Strategy 
The firms in the sample were chosen partly by the strategy they had according to the 
survey. The question regarding which strategy a company has was in a way disguised in 
the survey, as it asked how important low prices, high quality and innovation was in the 
firm’s competitive situation on a scale from 1 to 7. There was no internal ranking of the 
importance of the three. In effect, the respondent could say that all three were of the 
highest importance. In the survey, all except one company said that emphasis on 
innovation was important or very important in the competition with their competitors. 
When asked this question during the interview, significantly fewer stated that they 
actively and regularly perform innovativeness-building activities. Overstating 
innovativeness in the survey might have several reasons, for example the lack of ranking 
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between the three options, that respondents might want to show themselves in a good 
light (assuming that innovation is seen as something positive), or that the question has 
been misunderstood by the respondent.  
 
In the interviews, nine of the 14 companies were mainly exploitative by their own 
account (ie that they were more focused on cost-saving than innovation). The remaining 
five characterized themselves as innovative, and can be said to have an explorative 
strategy. The answers to this question in the interview was compared to the survey 
answer and showed that performing qualitative interviews yields a different perspective 
on how questions are answered compared to when a survey is filled out.   
4.2.2 Ownership  
Four of the firms interviewed are affiliates of listed companies either in Norway or 
abroad. One of these is half owned by employees and half owned by another Norwegian 
oil company. The interviewee explicitly stated that the company shareholder did not 
meddle in the firm’s business much, so this company is considered an independent, not 
listed company. The total of listed companies is then three, ie 21 percent. The rest are 
privately held, 21 percent are owned by investment funds and 57 percent are family 
owned or owned by a small group of owners.  
 
Table 3: Ownership (rounded) 
Ownership Percentage 
Listed or primarily affiliate of listed 21 % 
Private equity 21 % 
Family or independently owned 57 % 
 
In addition, 36 percent of the firms have employees as central owners. This was not 
stated in the survey by all of them, which again supports the notion that qualitative 
interviews can lead to additional information being uncovered.  
4.2.3 Organizational structure 
Norway is a generally non-hierarchical country, and the same is seen in the companies 
interviewed. Nearly all of the companies mentioned that their organizational structure is 
flat and that there are very short power distances internally. The larger international firms 
naturally have more layers in their organizations, but are similar to the other firms 
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interviewed within the Norwegian organization. The mid-sized firms usually have three 
levels of managers.  
 
The small firms are naturally the most polyarchical, usually with one or two levels of 
managers. The smaller firms often have a more powerful CEO, though, who is often also 
an owner of the company. 
 
“The CEO is very visible here. So he makes most decisions on the overarching level.” 
- HR responsible in small, exploitative firm 
4.2.4 Human capital 
The specifics of the human capital in the firms are listed in the table below. The main 
types of education levels are taken from the survey responses, and those types that 
encompass more than 20 percent of employees are listed.  
 
Table 4: Education level and firm specific knowledge 
Company Main type of education level High firm specific 
knowledge 
1 – large Craft certificate or bachelor degree No 
2 – small Master degree Yes, among core employees 
3 – mid-sized Bachelor or master degree No 
4 - mid-sized Craft certificate or bachelor degree No 
5 - small Master degree Yes 
6 – small Bachelor or master degree No 
7 – small No formal education, craft certificate or 
bachelor degree 
No 
8 – large  Bachelor or master degree Somewhat high 
9 – mid-sized No formal education, craft certificate or 
bachelor degree 
No 
10 – mid-sized Craft certificate or bachelor degree Somewhat high 
11 – mid-sized Craft certificate or bachelor degree No 
12 – mid-sized Bachelor or master degree  Yes 
13 – mid-sized Bachelor or master degree Somewhat high 
14 - large No formal education or craft certificate No 
 
The specification of whether there is a large degree of firm specific knowledge is based 
on the interviews and the survey. This proved valuable, because there are some 
discrepancies in the answers. From the survey, the firms’ responses to the degree of firm 
specific knowledge in employees and whether it would be easy for employees to do the 
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same job in competing firms are used to balance what was stated in the interviews. An 
aspect that becomes apparent when looking at the answers from the survey is that the 
respondents may not have had a clear image of what firm specific knowledge is, 
especially since many of those that claimed high firm specific knowledge also answered 
that the employees easily could perform the same work at a competing firm. This 
ambiguity of what firm specific knowledge is was something that was considered while 
executing the interviews, and the suspicion was confirmed. When asked bluntly whether 
employees had high firm specific knowledge the response was usually yes. However, 
when the question was rephrased, by asking if it took long for employees to be able to 
work independently (an indicator of firm specificity), the answer was often no. Generally, 
there seems to high industry specific knowledge and lower firm specific knowledge in the 
petroleum industry.  
4.2.5 Impact of downturn on the firm 
How hard the company is hit by the crisis is often evaluated by how much revenue drops 
compared to the budgeted revenue and the accompanying layoffs among the interviewed 
firms. All firms that had downsized said that the drop in the oil price had adversely 
affected them. The two companies that have not downsized nor used temporary layoffs 
said that they were not affected economically by the downturn, although they did see a 
certain drop in the amount of tenders to bid on, which was considered a negative effect.  
 
Among the companies that have downsized, the degree to which they are affected varies.  
One small company is almost on the verge of bankruptcy, and the HR responsible is 
himself on temporary leave due to the crisis.  
 
“We are a pretty small company. There hasn’t been a drop in demand, but it has been near impossible to 
be competitive. We have not been able to compete against foreign operators.” 
- HR responsible in small, explorative firm 
 
In the survey, the companies were asked to rate the impact the drop in the oil price and 
its repercussions had on them. The scale ranged from -5, highly negative, through 0, 
neutral, and up to 5, highly positive. The classification for how hard the firms were hit by 
the recession is included in table 5. Those that indicated a score of -5 and -4 are classified 
as highly negatively affected. Those who ticked -3 are seen as being negatively affected, 
and those who chose -2 and -1 are classified as somewhat negatively affected. None of 
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the firms indicated that they were not affected or positively affected. Since the survey 
was answered approximately a half-year before the interviews were conducted, the 
situation for the companies might have changed. This is adjusted for when needed in 
Table 5 by using information from the interviews.  
4.2.6 Layoffs 
All except three of the 14 firms had turned to layoffs due to decreased demand after the 
drop in the oil price. Temporary leaves were used by one of the companies that had not 
yet resorted to layoffs. This company had significantly cut prices, and put the employees 
that were least sellable on temporary leave. The percentage of employees laid off in 
companies that had resorted to this varied from 73 percent to 4 percent. Smaller 
companies are naturally proportionally more affected by each layoff than bigger 
companies, and the absolute numbers of layoffs are much larger in companies with more 
than 100 employees before the crisis.  
 
Table 5: Number of layoffs (approximately) due to the drop in demand after oil price 
decline at the time of the interview and impact of crisis on firm 
Company Employees 
before/now 
Percentage downsized Impact 
1 – large 520/400 23 % Somewhat negative 
2 – small 11/3 73 % Highly negative 
3 – mid-sized 200/150  25 % Highly negative 
4 - mid-sized 260/160  38 % Negative 
5 - small 35/35 0 Somewhat negative 
6 – small 40/40 0 Somewhat negative 
7 – small 25/21 16 % Highly negative 
8 – large  744/644 13 % Negative 
9 – mid-sized 124/100 19 % Highly negative 
10 – mid-sized 146/100 32 %  Negative 
11 – mid-sized 135/130 4 % Somewhat negative 
12 – mid-sized 105/105 0 (only temporary leaves) Somewhat negative 
13 – mid-sized 137/100 27 % Highly negative 
14 - large 650/370 43 % Negative 
 
Criter ia for  whom to layof f  
What might not come as a surprise is the conformity of the criteria for whom to lay off 
in the different firms. Four points are mentioned by nearly all; competence, suitability, 
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social criteria and seniority. All firms who mentioned seniority emphasized that this was 
not a primary criterion, but could be a determinant when all else was equal. One large 
company also mentioned diversity as one of the criteria they emphasized.  
 
Competence embodies formal and informal competence of an employee. By 
competence, the firms often mean the how salable a person is, how many billable hours 
they list and their prowess in the job. Suitability is similar to competence, but it is more 
in connection to the personality of the employee and its fit for the job and the company, 
whereas competence is more formalized and easier to quantify. Social criteria are 
personal characteristics or situations that might affect the layoff decision. For example, if 
the spouse of an employee recently has been laid off, this might help the employee in 
keeping their job. Seniority is the length of employment in the company for a person.  
 
Three firms had regular performance appraisal reviews that were used in the downsizing 
process. Some of the firms used formal performance appraisals when choosing whom to 
cut, but surprisingly many did not have any such recurring evaluations for use in 
downsizing situations. Several of the firms mentioned appraisal interviews 
(medarbeidersamtaler in Norwegian) as a factor that was considered when evaluating the 
employees, but that these were often based on direct managers’ memories and therefore 
might be subjective.  
 
Another point that arose in many of the interviews is that much of the business done in 
the petroleum industry is project-based. According to the firms, this affects the layoff 
process. When a project is cancelled ahead of time, the employees working there will 
either need to be reallocated to other projects, developmental activities or laid off/sent 
on temporary leave. The people that are needed currently and in the imminent future are 
therefore kept longer than those for which there is less need.  
 
“Our temporary leaves and our choices regarding who is put on temporary leave depend on how much we 
have had to do, like which competence we are completely reliant on to survive” 
- HR responsible, small, explorative firm.  
Who is  la id o f f   
The following table lists which employees were laid off first in the different firms. If the 
firm has had several layoff rounds with different types of layoffs, the type of people or 
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the criteria used are listed as well. In addition, the characteristics of the employees the 
firms try to keep in a layoff process and the percentage of layoffs are listed 
 
Table 6: Who is laid off first, who is laid off in case of several layoff rounds, 
characteristics of employees that are tried retained, and percentage downsized 
Company First laid off Subsequently Characteristics of 
those tried kept 
Percentage 
downsized 
1 – large Cutting costs in 
departments, selection 
based on performance 
review and criteria 
Same criteria Those with prowess 
in their jobs 
23 % 
2 – small Administration Those without 
projects 
- 73 % 
3 – mid-
sized 
Administration Those with narrow 
skill set, low 
performers on the 
criteria scale 
All-rounders and 
those with highest 
amount of billable 
hours.  
25 % 
4 - mid-
sized 
Administration, engineers 
without projects 
Engineers without 
projects 
Those with 
experience and 
product knowledge 
38 % 
5 - small No layoffs - - 0 
6 – small No layoffs - - 0 
7 – small All kinds of employees - Special competences, 
necessary for core 
operations 
16 % 
8 – large  Engineers and 
administration 
Those not needed 
for current projects 
Has to keep 
competency 
13 % 
9 – mid-
sized 
All kinds of employees - Tries to think of 
positions rather than 
people 
19 % 
10 – mid-
sized 
Engineers, mechanics, 
project managers 
Administration, 
electricians 
Tries to keep 
electricians  
32 %  
11 – mid-
sized 
Support functions and sales - - 4 % 
12 – mid-
sized 
Cross-functional 
employees, without very 
specific special competence 
- How salable they are 0 (only 
temporary 
leaves) 
13 – mid-
sized 
All kinds of employees - Has defined core 
employees  
27 % 
14 - large All kinds of employees - Those with core 
competences 
43 % 
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One clear pattern is that administrative personnel are laid off first. More than half of the 
companies interviewed explicitly mentioned in the interviews that employees without 
technological knowledge were among the first to be laid off: administration and sales 
people. Many chose to allocate some of the technical personnel’s time to do these types 
of tasks. Another clear pattern among the rest of the firms is that all types of employees 
in a firm are affected in the first layoff rounds.  
4.2.7 Temporary leaves 
Nine of the 14 companies are currently using temporary leaves as a means to tackle the 
drop in demand. Several state that the reason for this is that they hope that demand will 
pick up before the maximum time for temporary leaves is surpassed. Some also 
mentioned that temporary leaves is a way to “get rid of employees they do not need”, as 
many find a new job while on temporary leaves, which saves the company costs 
associated with having to pay salary in the layoff notice period (usually three months).  
 
The new temporary leave rules of July 1st 2015 give companies the opportunity to use 
temporary leaves for 30 weeks, as opposed to 26 weeks before (Nito, 2015). This change 
was considered beneficial by all firms, but many mentioned that four extra weeks do not 
make a big difference for them.  
4.2.8 Reallocation of personnel 
When asked whether they actively tried to reallocate their employees if their initial work 
became redundant, the answer was yes from 12 and no from two of the firms. As noted 
earlier, many reassign some administrative tasks to technical personnel when 
administration is laid off. Some firms reallocate engineers from office work to fieldwork 
and some of the companies with offices in several countries had sent people abroad. 
Several firms mentioned the importance of having versatile employees that can be of use 
in several different situations.  
 
Three firms had reallocated or planned to reallocate employees to developmental project. 
One of these firms (mid-sized) stated that they did not see any significant results from 
this reallocation, as the most talented people had enough normal work, and the less 
talented people did not manage to drive development projects sufficiently for much good 
to come of it.  
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“The employees who are not as initiative seeking, or so, they become available. That means that, yes, the 
available people can do development work, but then you need someone to lead that. And that would be 
the people that are selling and are doing everything else, so we are struggling to see a real effect of it.” 
- CEO in mid-sized, exploitative firm 
4.2.9 Other measures 
In many instances several other means of cost saving are implemented before 
downsizing. Spending on social events and such were cut in many instances. Three firms 
effectuated pay cuts with support from the employees. Three firms stated that they were 
planning to use excess time for competence building activities.  
 
Interestingly, one mid-size firm had hired a new sales person whose extensive network in 
land based industry was hoped to provide the company with projects in other industries 
within oil and gas. Several other firms also stated they were trying to enter or expand into 
new areas of business. Another large firm held a conference for the entire company after 
they had decided that they would resort to downsizing, but justified this by saying that 
the company had to focus on the future even if there had to be layoffs.  
4.2.10 Effect on motivation of survivors 
For many of the firms it was important to make sure that the process of getting 
information to the employees was swift to minimize uncertainty. Several subjects said 
that they had all-hands meetings for the entire company only after they had informed the 
affected employees.  
 
Most of the firms discussed the criteria for selection with either the labor unions or the 
employee representative, so that these were kept in the loop and given a chance to affect 
the final criteria. Several of the firms that has downsized said that they had received 
positive feedback from the employees on how the process had been handled.  
4.2.11 Experience from previous crises 
When the interviewee was asked whether previous experiences with crises affected how 
the process was handled this time around there were several types of answers. Some 
immediately mentioned their own experience as a crucial factor in this downsizing 
process, while others perceived the question more in the lines of the organizational 
learning that affected the layoff process. Of the 12 firms which had resorted to 
downsizing or temporary leaves, four said that personal experiences had affected how 
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they handled the process, four said that organizational experiences affected how the 
process was conducted, and three explicitly mentioned that both personal and 
organizational experiences affected the process. One company said it was not affected by 
previous crises, but this person was himself on temporary leave and was not directly 
involved in the process.  
Personal exper ience  
One HR director said that he has gone against the initial wishes of several CEOs of the 
company over the years due to his previous experience with what works in layoff 
processes. He was adamant that the direct managers of the affected employees had to be 
a vital part in the decision process and that they should be the key messenger toward the 
employees, whereas the CEOs had meant that HR should be the main point of contact 
and decision maker. The HR director stated that the layoff process would just have been 
an exercise for the HR department in that case, and he did not think that would benefit 
the remaining workers’ motivation if decisions were top down. He believed it was 
important that the direct managers were leaders in both good and bad times, to built 
trust and become a true leader.  
 
Others mentioned that experiences they had in earlier stages of their careers affected 
how they approached the current process. Two mentioned their roles as layoff agents 
previously, and how having to lay off people directly has lead them to be more vary of 
how the process is conducted, and that this had heightened the significance of there 
being individuals on the receiving end of the bad news. One CEO stated that he had 
learned from previous layoff processes that it is important to start with a wider specter of 
measures and aim for a higher percentage of layoff than what is actually needed, because 
things do not go according to plan so there is need for a buffer.  
Organizat ional l earning 
Those that mentioned that previous crises had an effect on how the layoff process was 
done this time mainly had a less-than-ideal process previously. Three of the firms also 
mentioned that they had seen ups and downs in the industry before, and that this kept 
optimism for the future high, because they expect the dip to be temporary.  
 
The company that had downsized the most was hit extremely hard by the financial crisis 
in 2008 had since been very careful in their hiring, and now nearly only use consultants 
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or hired manpower. The interviewee said that having few permanent employees, the 
quickly can let go of those who are not needed due to a lack of projects.  
 
One company that had not downsized before said that it had no previous organizational 
experiences to rely on in this process, but they definitely would bring lessons from the 
current process with them in the future.  
4.2.12 Expected length of reduction in demand  
When the firms were asked what their expectations for the longevity of the downturn for 
their company, several of the pointed out that they thought this was the start of a 
permanent shift in the industry. Three firms explicitly stated that they expected a change 
of paradigm due to the drop in the oil price; that the locus on the oil and gas industry in 
Norway would shift to something else.  
 
The following table summarizes when the firms first noticed times were harder, and their 
expectations of the length of the downturn for the company. In some of the interviews, 
these questions were not asked, and are therefore left blank in the table.  
 
Table 7: Expected length of demand reduction 
Company First noticed drop Expectation of length Percentage downsized 
1 – large August 2015 2017 23 % 
2 – small Before drop in oil price Will take a long time 73 % 
3 – mid-sized Early 2014 Some more years 25 % 
4 - mid-sized Fall 2014 2018 38 % 
5 - small Not been directly affected - 0 
6 – small   0 
7 – small May 2014 2016/2017 16 % 
8 – large  Fall 2014 At best 2017 13 % 
9 – mid-sized Fall 2014 The worst is over 19 % 
10 – mid-sized - Long time 32 %  
11 – mid-sized - - 4 % 
12 – mid-sized Fall 2014 Improvements in a few months 0 (only temp leaves) 
13 – mid-sized Fall 2014 - 27 % 
14 - large Fall 2014 Will never be the same 43 % 
	   55 
4.3 External  
4.3.1 Balance of power in the business environment 
The petroleum industry in Norway is dominated by a few large oil companies and Statoil 
is by far the largest actor (Blomgren et al., 2015). There is however a plethora of 
subcontractors that deliver solutions to the main exploiters of the oil field, which can 
impact how the firms interviewed perceive their dependence on major players in the 
industry. The large oil companies can have a great impact on the companies interviewed. 
One interviewee mentioned that the oil companies can stop projects with extremely 
short notice. One firm said that they had a project cancelled with only two days notice.  
 
“We have been relatively lucky, in all this. Because we are not THAT dependent on Statoil. There are 
some that have nearly no other customers than Statoil.” 
- HR director in large, exploitative firm 
  
The dependence on certain big clients especially affects those companies that are 
involved in the development of new oil fields, whereas the companies that do 
maintenance work on platforms etc are less severely affected by the drop in the oil price, 
as this is work that cannot be put off.  
 
Table 8: Percentage of revenue from the three largest customers for the firm 
Company Most important 
customer (%) 
Second most 
important (%) 
Third most 
important (%) 
Total three most 
important (%) 
Percentage 
downsized 
1 – large 15 14 10 39 23 % 
2 – small 60 35 5 100 73 % 
3 – mid-sized 50 30 10 90 25 % 
4 - mid-sized 50 30 0 80 38 % 
5 - small 40 25 10 75 0 
6 – small 40 20 10 70 0 
7 – small 50 20 20 90 16 % 
8 – large  40 20 20 80 13 % 
9 – mid-sized 40 20 5 65 19 % 
10 – mid-sized 0 0 0 0 32 %  
11 – mid-sized 70 25 3 98 4 % 
12 – mid-sized 4 3 3 10 0  
13 – mid-sized 40 25 5 70 27 % 
14 - large 20 15 10 45 43 % 
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Looking at the importance of the top three customers in the context of the percentage of 
layoffs, there does not seem to be any significant indicators that those with high 
dependence on one to three large customers layoff more or retain more. Firms with high 
dependence and firms with low dependence on a few large customers have low and high 
percentages of layoffs.  
4.3.2 The Work Environment Act  
The regulations for the work environment in Norway are implicitly embedded in the 
downsizing process, as all the firms are obliged to follow the law. Many do not mention 
the law explicitly, and when it is asked about, the replies are usually along the lines of the 
Work Environment Act regulating much of the process; it is basically the skeleton the 
firms build the downsizing progress on. In some instances where firms have operations 
abroad it was mentioned that downsizing was quicker in other countries due to less 
stringent regulations.  
4.3.3 Media 
One of the questions asked in the interviews was whether the interviewee believed that 
the media pressure on the crisis affects how decisions are made. Most of the companies 
answered that this did not matter. Some of the subjects said that it was likely that the 
wide media coverage of the tough times in the oil industry affected the people in the 
company, either consciously or unconsciously. However, many mentioned that it was 
easier to obtain understanding from the people in the organization on the impending 
layoff process due to the wide media coverage than it would have been without the 
coverage.  
4.3.4 Labor unions  
Approximately half of the firms interviewed said that labor unions have a strong 
presence in their organization. Eight of the firms said that labor unions are strongly 
present in their organization, and that they have an influence on the layoff processes in 
the company. Four companies said there are labor unions represented in their 
organization, but that these do not have a strong presence and do not influence the 
layoff process. Two of the firms have no or very little presence of labor unions.  
 
Of the firms that say the labor union are strong in their organization, several note that 
due to meetings with and involvement of the labor unions the processes move more 
slowly than they would have elsewise. A couple of the companies donned the labor 
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unions a policing role, because they do not change anything in the process, but by having 
them present the company was conscious of keeping in line even more than they would 
have been without the labor unions present. 
4.4 Decision processes 
This part will cover how the problems identified within the organization, who is involved 
in the decision-making, and how the decision-making process plays out.  
4.4.1 Identifying the problem 
How the problem is identified follows roughly the same pattern for most of the firms 
interviewed: the management identifies an unwanted trend in the financial situation for 
the company. Many also report a drop in demand for projects and sudden cancellations 
as a major initiator for the layoff and temporary leave process. The problem is identified 
through what the business can actually see in their accounting data. One company, 
internationally listed, stated that the reason for the initiation of the process was that the 
owners wanted better results. 
 
The internationally owned firms said that they are to a large degree autonomous in their 
management, and that the problems are identified in the Norwegian management team. 
It was mentioned that if the Norwegian management had not taken action as early as 
they did, the international management would have contacted them to initiate measures. 
 
One divergence from the normal problem identification was one company that started to 
downsize long before the drop in the oil price. The CEO of this company said that he 
had seen that the costs in the oil industry were way to high, which made him doubt the 
sustainability of the amount of people employed in the sector. The company thus started 
downsizing in 2010 in their petroleum-focused departments. Initially, it was hard to gain 
understanding from the organization for the changes, and the management had 
difficulties legitimizing the downsizing. Now that the drop in the oil price lead to a 
massive drop in demand, though, the organization has managed well and not downsized 
again.   
4.4.2 Involved parties in the decision-making 
Higher-level decision-making, such as whether there is a need for layoffs, how many 
need to be laid off, and the time-frame for the process, is done by the people with the 
top profit/loss responsibility for the organization, usually the CEO. In the more 
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hierarchical organizations with division managers who have the financial responsibility of 
their sub-organizations, these are highly involved in the process. They crawl their 
organization for possible improvements and needed adjustment, creating a plan for 
layoffs if needed. This plan is then revised and approved by the CEO. The following 
paragraphs will outline how different stakeholders in the organizations affect the decision 
processes.  
 
Owners 
Here it is useful to distinguish between owners that are a highly involved part in the daily 
dealings of the organization and those that are not. The owners frequently have more 
regular dealings with small, family-owned or independent firms. Often owners are key 
employees in these cases, and part of the management group. They thus have much say 
in the decision-making. For firms with less direct contact with owners, the situation is 
somewhat different. In some instances the owners required higher returns, which 
initiated cost saving processes in the organizations.  
 
The internationally owned companies stated that they were mostly independent from the 
mother entity, but that if the Norwegian organization had not reacted as early as they 
had, the international management would contact them to set things in motion. When 
asked whether the international management gave instructions for what should be done 
with staffing, one interview subject replied the following.  
 
“No, they [international management] provide guidelines. But we have to face Norwegian laws and 
collective agreements. Obviously you can’t slalom your way around that […]” 
- HR manager in mid-sized, explorative firm 
  
CEO 
In most of the firms, the CEO is the initiator and final decision-maker. All of the firms 
mentioned the CEO as a key person in the decision processes, often having to give 
consent for a decision to be executed.  
 
One mid-sized firm’s HR director explained that the CEO was not part of the decisions 
concerning who to lay off, but that the responsibility lay with the HR director and the 
direct manager of the affected department. The CEO was kept in the loop all along the 
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process and was given reasoning for why the decisions were made, but did not directly 
affect it. This is the exception rather than the rule.  
 
Management team, excluding HR 
The management team is mentioned in most firms as being a vital part of the decision 
making process by being part of discussions. The management team usually consists of 
the CEO, an HR function and head of finance at the core, and depending on the 
company different division directors are included. The management team usually takes 
part in the primary discussions on criteria and selection of employees to be laid off.  
 
HR 
The HR function plays an important part in most of the companies where such a role 
exists. The notable exception is a small company where HR responsible is on temporary 
leave, and therefore not included in the process.  
 
For mid-sized and large companies, HR’s main task is to make sure that the process 
follows legal guidelines and internal goals. HR is often part of the management team and 
is therefore a part of the discussions of selection criteria and downsizing choices. One 
HR director in a large company dubbed himself the “executioner” in the company – he 
had only recently started there, knew no one, and was the one to sign all letters of notice.  
 
Department managers 
Department managers are middle managers that have a leadership role for a specific 
department within the organization. The reoccurring theme in the organizations that 
have these types of positions is that these managers are involved in the selection of who 
to lay off. The reasoning for this is that these are the ones that know the employees best. 
The decision does not lay on these managers alone, though, the selection has to be 
argued for and several discussion rounds with upper level management and HR are done 
before the final selection. Before a final decision is made, there are talks conducted with 
the employees by the department manager and, usually, HR to uncover if there are social 
criteria that might affect the layoff decision.  
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Labor unions 
Labor unions have been covered earlier, but the main point for those companies that 
have a strong presence of unions is that they are involved in discussions on layoff criteria 
and that they make the process longer than if they were not present. Most companies say 
that the labor unions are cooperative in times like these, but there are exceptions:  
 
“They actually demanded extensive pay raises, and man count increases, too, just a couple of months ago, 
where this… You start to wonder, do they not watch the news or read… They should be worried about 
completely different things, right. So in that sense they are pretty, maybe a little myopic, in our opinion.” 
- CEO in mid-sized, exploitative firm 
 
Employee representatives 
In instances where there are no labor unions the employee representative often takes the 
part of the labor union, and is part of the discussions regarding layoff criteria.  
 
Employees 
None of the firms interviewed said that their employees directly affect the decisions 
made other than through their representatives and by highlighting social criteria that can 
affect the layoff decision.  
4.4.3 Characteristics of the decision-making process  
Once the problem has been identified, the most common next step is that the 
management discusses what needs to be done and set a number of layoffs they deem 
necessary. Then middle managers are invited to give their input on how they can 
downsize in their department, and sometimes given the task of choosing whom to lay 
off. Labor unions are often involved in the molding of the criteria as well as in the 
discussion meeting between manager and employee.  
 
In one of the small firms that has not downsized due to the drop in the oil price, the 
CEO has taken a strong stance saying that the company will get through this. He has, in 
cooperation with the board (of which he himself is part), decided to not downsize, but 
rather use slack for developmental activities. In this case, the head of administration and 
HR was interviewed and said “the CEO is very visible here”. Another small firm that had 
not downsized is family-owned, currently with the founder’s son as the CEO and the 
founder now as Chief Financial Officer. This company downsized considerably in 2010 
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on the founder and then-CEO’s orders, as he believed the projects in oil and gas were 
not sustainable.  
4.4.4 Evaluating the process 
Next to none of the companies formally evaluated the layoff process. Several of the 
companies said that what they learned during the downsizing would affect future 
decision-making processes, and in that sense there is an evaluation of what was 
successful and what was not. Most companies stated that a layoff process was considered 
successful if there were no legal repercussions from the victims of layoffs.  
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5. Analysis 
Having outlined the main results from the interviews conducted in the Results section, 
this part will expand on those results that are most interesting for answering the research 
questions for this thesis. The questions are repeated here to refresh the memory of the 
reader:  
 
1. Who is laid off in a downturn and why are they chosen?  
2. Who is involved in the decision-making process? 
3. How does the decision-making process unfold? 
4. Which factors influence decision-making? 
 
5.1 Lay offs and downsizing 
5.1.1 Layoffs and firm specific knowledge 
Knudsen and Lien (2015b) hypothesize that employees with firm specific knowledge will 
be hoarded for longer periods of time than those with more general knowledge. 
Conversely one would expect employees with less firm specific knowledge to be laid off 
first. The data gathered in this study is ambiguous on this matter. As discussed in Results, 
many firms do cut administration first, which can be assumed to be employees with more 
general knowledge, but other firms cut engineers and mechanics first - employees one 
would imagine had a higher percentage of firm specific knowledge. However, this may be 
because the industry is mainly exploitative, and because there seems to be less firm 
specific knowledge and more industry specific knowledge in the oil and gas industry 
according to the firms. The generally low level of firm specific knowledge reported by 
the firms supports this. Most employees can do a similar job in a competing company. 
The adjustment costs from training new labor are therefore considered to not be very 
high. However, it can be expected that core employees are the most important for 
obtaining new projects. Should a new project be won after core employees had been laid 
off, it would be necessary to search for new such employees, which indicates adjustment 
costs for hiring. An increase in administration after downsizing will probably not have 
the same urgency when a project is won, and the adjustment costs from hiring new such 
employees is deemed to be lower.  
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Following the arguments on adjustment costs, it is reasonable for the firms to keep their 
core employees longer than administrative personnel. There does not seem to be any 
significant differences in the type of people who are laid off in explorative and 
exploitative firms, both types of firms have followed the two main patterns of layoffs; 
cutting administration first or cutting all types of employees first. In the firms that have 
downsized across the board, most of the activity of employees that perform core work is 
connected to projects from clients, and it is often these employees that are idle when 
projects are stopped. Most likely these firms find that the adjustment costs for rehiring 
do not outweigh the cost of labor hoarding.  
 
The following table displays results that will be discussed and drawn lines between in this 
section. The perceived impact of the crisis on the firm, the strategy, the expectation of 
the length of the downturn, the percentage downsized, and the willingness to reallocate 
employees is included. This is done because these results are deemed interesting to 
further investigate as they are expected to impact downsizing.  
 
Table 9: Compilation of selected results 
Company Impact Business 
model  
Expectation 
of length 
Percentage 
downsized 
Re-
allocation 
1 – large Somewhat negative Exploitation   Optimistic 23 % Yes 
2 – small Highly negative Exploration Pessimistic 73 % Yes 
3 – mid-sized Highly negative Exploitation Pessimistic 25 % Yes 
4 - mid-sized Negative Exploitation Pessimistic 38 % Yes 
5 - small Somewhat negative Exploitation - 0 Yes 
6 – small Somewhat negative Exploration - 0 Yes 
7 – small Highly negative Exploration Optimistic 16 % No 
8 – large  Negative Exploitation Pessimistic 13 % No 
9 – mid-sized Highly negative Exploration  Optimistic 19 % Yes 
10 – mid-sized Negative Exploitation Pessimistic 32 %  Yes 
11 – mid-sized Somewhat negative Exploration  - 4 % Yes 
12 – mid-sized Somewhat negative Exploitation Optimistic 0  Yes 
13 – mid-sized Highly negative Exploitation - 27 % Yes 
14 - large Negative Exploitation Pessimistic 43 % Yes 
 
5.1.2 Layoffs, impact and expected length 
Since the expectation of length is hypothesized to impact labor hoarding, this is 
interesting to examine. What constitutes a long expectation of length of the crisis is hard 
to say, but a reasonable estimate is that if a firm believes the crisis will be over in 2016, it 
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is optimistic, whereas a firm that believes the downturn will last longer than 2017 can be 
considered pessimistic. Firms 2, 3, 4, 8, 10 and 14 are determined to have a pessimistic 
expectation for the length of the crisis. 
 
Table 10: Firm strategy, expectation of length and average percentage downsized 
  Optimistic Pessimistic 
Exploitative 12% 30% 
Explorative 18% 73% 
 
From table 10, we see that firms with a pessimistic outlook on the future seem to 
downsize more than those with an optimistic outlook. However, the results for 
explorative firms are hard to generalize, as only one firm has a pessimistic outlook. There 
also seems to be a difference between explorative and exploitative firms in the downsized 
percentage. The three firms with the highest percentage of layoffs in the sample have a 
pessimistic outlook on the future. If we assume that those with higher percentages of 
layoffs labor hoard less, this would support Knudsen and Lien’s (2015b) hypothesis that 
if a drop in demand is considered temporary the firm has a higher propensity for labor 
hoarding, and likewise that firms with more pessimistic outlook on the future tend to 
labor hoard less.  
 
Table 11: Firm strategy, impact of crisis and average percentage downsized 
  Highly negative 
impact 
Somewhat 
negative impact 
Exploitative 26% 8% 
Explorative 36% 2% 
 
From table 11, it is clear that those firms that were highly negatively impacted by the 
crisis downsize on average much more than firms that were only somewhat negatively 
affected. Exploitative firms that have a strong negative effect seems to downsize less 
than explorative firms in the same bracket. For the firms with a weak negative effect, the 
reverse is seen; exploitative firms downsize more than explorative.  
 
Three out of five explorative firms said that the crisis had a highly negative impact on 
them. Two out of the nine exploitative firms said the same. Since the sample is not very 
large, it is hard to draw certain conclusions, but it seems like explorative firms are hit 
harder by the crisis than their exploitative counterpart. One reason for this might be that 
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some of the explorative firms offer services and products that are untraditional and not 
well known for the decision-makers in the potential buyers.  
 
”And the oil fields are often owned, one field is often owned by many partners, so the decision-processes 
are quite extensive. Big meetings, long meetings. Much trying to convince someone who might own a big 
part of the field who is against installing a system or something, while three are for the process, and then 
it takes time, you know.” 
- CEO, small, explorative firm 
 
In a time of crisis it can be assumed that it will be even harder to convince a skeptic to 
make an investment in an untraditional system. The system in question is one that is said 
to give increased accuracy in drilling, which can save the oil company from drilling an 
empty well. However, it requires a much larger upfront investment than traditional 
systems. This decision can be said to be in the domain of gain with high probability as 
explained by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) – investing in a traditional or innovative 
system will both generate revenue for the oil company, but the perceived riskiness can 
make the possibly higher revenue from the innovative system less attractive for the 
investing company. The drop in the oil price amplifies the effect of this, because the 
larger upfront investment may become harder to justify to the skeptics. This effect 
greatly affected the firm in question, and they are struggling to keep afloat.    
 
The firms with pessimistic outlook on the future have all downsized, many of them more 
than equivalent optimistic firms. It is interesting to assess the expectations for the future 
in light of the initial impact of the crisis.  
 
None of the firms that answered they were somewhat negatively affected by the crisis has 
a pessimistic view on the length of the crisis; they believe the worst is over or the oil 
price will increase by 2017. Three of these firms have not downsized due to the crisis, 
one firm downsized 4 percent and one downsized 23 percent. The latter is a big firm that 
might well have used the drop in the oil price as an opportunity for rightsizing, as it has 
an optimistic outlook on the future and has not been significantly negatively affected by 
the downturn.  
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Of the nine firms that had a negative or highly negative impact from the crisis, two have 
an optimistic outlook on the future, saying that the worst is over or nearly over. These 
two have downsized by 16 and 19 percent, averaging 18 percent. From table 9, we can 
see that five of the six firms that have a pessimistic outlook on the future have 
downsized by more than 30 percent – which can be said to be a significant decrease in 
staff. The remaining firm with a negative impact and a pessimistic outlook has downsized 
by 13 percent, making the average 37 percent. These firms all said in the survey that the 
drop in the oil price negatively or highly negatively affected them. From this, it seems 
reasonable to draw the conclusion that firms that were negatively impacted by the crisis 
and that have a pessimistic outlook on the future generally downsize more than those 
with a more optimistic outlook that also were negatively affected.  
5.1.3 Labor hoarding and rightsizing 
Reallocation of employees when the original work of the employee is superfluous is 
present in all but two of the interviewed firms. Several of these said that employees had 
been or would be reallocated to developmental activities or would be put to skill 
enhancing activities. This indicates that labor hoarding is present in many of the firms, 
also the ones that are downsizing. The tendency in the firms which cut administration 
first to reallocate employees with core technical knowledge to more general work shows 
that firms in many cases want to retain their core employees even if there is slack in their 
normal tasks, signifying labor hoarding of this type of employee. Core employees can be 
those employees that perform the services the company offers, for example an engineer 
performing maintenance work on an oil platform. 
 
The results from the interviews suggest that non-core employees and employees that 
cannot be given new work when projects are lost are the ones that are laid off first. Firms 
try to a large extent to retain employees that are considered crucial for continuing the 
core business. This indicates labor hoarding of core employees on behalf of non-core 
employees. Additionally, many firms see the downturn as an opportunity to make their 
organization more efficient by letting go employees that do not give the expected return 
on investment. An aspect of this is that many of the firms use this process as a way of 
rightsizing the company, ie making it more efficient by getting rid of those employees 
that are not yielding an required return. Several firms said that they cut the “deadweight” 
first. This is a logical consequence of the criteria that are set as well, since the criteria 
were based on competence and suitability for the work. By choosing competence as a 
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first criterion, the firm can exploit the opportunity for laying off unwanted workers, 
which could not be legitimated in normal business times.  
 
5.2 Decision-making 
Having widely covered who is involved in decision-making in the Results section, we 
now turn to look more at how they are involved and what influences the decision-making 
process. Decision-making is done both on an overall level of what to do in the 
organization when a crisis occurs, and how to select which employees are affected by 
layoffs. These two will be discussed separately. 
5.2.1 Overall decision-making process 
Mintzberg et al’s (1976) identification phase includes the top management in most of the 
companies. The problem is usually identified by the numbers not being good enough, ie 
by statistics and use of description-based decision-making, or by sudden cancellation of 
projects, a sort of external shock.  
 
In the development phase firms should ideally develop and evaluate several options. 
Most of the firms interviewed have tried other means of cost saving before downsizing. 
Several mentioned an increased focus on billable hours and pay cuts. Some also 
mentioned decreasing money spend on social activities such as holiday parties. These 
measures do not seem to be enough in many of the firms interviewed – many of them 
quickly turn to cuts in human capital. Mintzberg et al’s (1976) hypothesis that only one 
solution is developed fully seems to be consistent with what is happening in the sample 
firms. Bounded rationality of decision-makers seems prevalent in the development phase. 
There is no clear information on how the oil price will develop in the time to come, as 
this is dependent on so many factors. The information available to decision-makers is 
less than ideal, and this influences the basis for which the decisions are made. This is 
bounded rationality in action.  
 
In the selection phase, management screen and evaluate the possible solutions to the 
problem. If the solution is temporary leaves or layoffs, the authorization of the solution 
most commonly lays with the CEO. 
 
	   68 
Some firms initiated pay cuts, which needs to be supported by all employees to be 
implemented, ie unanimous authorization is needed from the organization. The selection 
phase here is highly colored by the political support routine – employees have to be 
convinced that a pay cut is necessary. In several companies this proved difficult when 
some employees were clearly earning the company more than others. The interviewees in 
these cases said it was difficult to gain understanding from all involved, but that the 
overall situation in the industry led those disgruntled to accept a pay cut. Since pay cuts 
did not solve the problems identified, the firms needed to go back to the development 
phase to find new solutions, iterating as predicted by Mintzberg et al (1976).  
 
The dissemination sub-routine of communication, gaining traction for the chosen 
solution, seems to be widely assisted by the general crisis mode in the industry and the 
dire picture painted by the media.  
5.2.2 Layoff decision-making process 
Once it has been identified that downsizing is necessary, the development phase 
regarding layoffs is initiated. It is in this stage the layoff criteria are developed.  
 
In the development phase the number of layoffs needed and the criteria for selection are 
chosen. Some of the firms interviewed do use the search routine mentioned by 
Mintzberg et al (1976) by implementing similar decisions from earlier crises. For the firm 
that have not downsized before, the design routine is used to some extent, ie a new 
solution is created. Many of the firms that have downsized before have never done it on 
such a large scale, and therefore make a new set of decisions that is only partly influenced 
by previous organizational processes, but often affected by personal experiences of 
decision-makers. Combing logic through experience-based decision-making (criteria) 
with quantitative goals set through description-based decision-making (number of 
layoffs) is used to determine how to move forward.  
 
In the development phase for decision-making on downsizing criteria for selection are 
set by the management and discussed with the relevant stakeholder representatives. Here 
the communication and political support routines are active, both by getting the 
information to the affected people and by persuading the affected parties that the 
decision is correct and necessary.  
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In the selection phase, some firms use earlier performance reviews to evaluate the 
employees, whereas most firms simply select whom to layoff by using the set of criteria 
created for this process. Meetings with the employees are then conducted to reveal any 
social criteria that might affect the layoff decision. This is the only phase where the 
employees are directly involved.  
 
In the downsizing decision-making process, most firms follow the expected process to a 
large extent by going through the three decision-making phases and iterating to solve the 
underlying problem of a drop in demand. Both experience- and description-based 
decision-making are seen throughout this process. This will be discussed further in 
section 5.3.1.  
 
When considering who is involved in the decision-making, most of the firms seem to 
follow the Systemic Bureaucracy Model (SBM) for decision-making from Shrivastava and 
Grant’s (1985) framework, ie that organizational rules and norms are at the heart of the 
decision process. External stakeholders are involved through labor unions 
representatives where eligible. This seems to promote a feeling of fairness in the 
organizations. It also means that all blame will not be laid on the CEO, thus minimizing 
adverse effects that might arise if the decision is considered wrong later on. Sharing 
responsibility for decisions will reduce the risk of backlash for the CEO, making the 
prospect of loss smaller. Increased size of the company leads to an increase in the 
hierarchy, which makes the organizational structure more of a bureaucracy, necessitating 
involvement of several layers in the organization.  
 
Some of the smaller firms have stronger CEOs and follow the Managerial Autocracy 
Model (MAM) to a noticeable extent. Two of the firms interviewed that had not 
downsized expressed that the decision not to downsize lay with the CEO. One firm that 
was downsizing had a CEO that made most of the final decisions and was by the HR 
responsible described as a “special” man who is adamant about cutting employees. In the 
non-downsizing firms, the strong position of the CEO seems to be viewed as something 
positive, and they are considered good leaders. 
5.2.3 Differences in decision-making in a downturn vs upswing 
The downsizing processes in the firms would not have happened had there not been an 
external shock. For one, it would probably not have been necessary from a financial 
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standpoint. Secondly, it would have been hard for the firms to justify large-scale layoffs 
without an external explanation. However, some differences in hiring processes and 
downsizing processes were pointed out by several interview subjects, which to a certain 
extent can be generalized for expansions and recessions. In this stylized example hiring is 
an expansion activity and layoffs is a recession activity. The point that was made was that 
hiring decisions was delegated more to the different departments, whereas layoff 
decisions to a larger extent needed to involve central management. This means that when 
a department has gotten authorization to hire, the department manager has the most say 
in who is hired and simply needs approval from top management, whereas in layoff 
situations the selection decision process involved top management to a much larger 
degree. It can thus be said that decision-making is decentralized in good times and 
centralized in a downturn.  
 
5.3 Factors affecting decision-makers 
From the previous analysis, it is clear that the impact of the downturn and the expected 
length of the crisis combined influences how many people are laid off in a firm. These 
overarching factors influence the decision-making process by constructing the frame in 
which the decisions have to be made. Several other factors that influence the decision-
makers have been identified in the interviews. These are explored below.  
5.3.1 Experience-, description- and heuristic-based decisions 
From the interviews it is clear that experience play an important part in how the layoff 
process is carried out. Those interviewees with longer experience and previous 
encounters with crisis situations state that their prior involvement in such activities has 
made it clear to them that certain measures have to be incorporated. Those who had not 
downsized earlier statements on bringing what the organization learned to the next crisis 
highlights that the decision-makers are aware that experiences are important aspect of 
decision-making. Several of the decision-makers who had shorter tenure in their current 
company emphasized that their previous experiences affected the decision process, 
making it clear that experience is important.   
 
One HR director with nearly 30 years experience in HR answered the following when 
asked whether he had learned a lot from earlier downsizing processes.  
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“I have become more clear on that the department managers are key positions in these processes as well 
[downsizing]. So, I have had, in the first five years I have been here, this is my third CEO. […] And 
they have all had as a common idea that HR should conduct the downsizing process. And I completely 
disagree.” 
- HR director in large, exploitative firm 
 
This company was consistently utilizing department managers in the selection and 
implementation of the downsizing strategy, due to the HR director’s logic based on 
experience.  
 
Pollard and Hotho (2006) point out that in the increasingly dynamic and changing world 
we live in relying on previous experience might not be the best solution. However, when 
it comes to downsizing, it is reasonable to believe that cumulative experiences are an 
advantage rather than a hindrance, since human feelings toward how they are treated 
probably does not change widely due to a changing environment.  
 
Description-based decisions through statistics and numbers are being used in all the 
companies both when it comes to defining the problem and when it comes to how many 
have to be laid off. The main point here is the extensive use of budgeting and continuous 
updating of budgets. When deciding to downsize, most firms say that they are not 
affected by what other actors in the industry are doing or by the media. Several subjects 
said that their decisions were based on actual numbers and budgets, which is more 
consistent with a rational approach. It is likely, though, that the interviewees want to 
present themselves as rational decision-makers, thus underemphasizing the effect of 
outside influences. It is also possible that the decision-makers are influenced 
subconsciously by the pessimistic media coverage, a point several of the interviewees 
brought up. In addition, budgets are based on expectations for the future, and 
information on the future is imperfect, hindering full rationality.  
 
A downsizing process takes time, and there is a lot of iteration in the decision process, so 
the use of heuristics in decisions concerning whom to lay off might be somewhat limited. 
The reason for this is that most companies tend to involve multiple persons in the 
decision-making process, and extensively discuss the repercussions of decisions. 
However, a big influence for the extent of downsizing is connected to the expected 
length of the crisis. Many firms would not downsize if they believed that their employees 
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would be working at full capacity soon. Remembering the graphs in the introduction and 
the frequent fluctuations in the oil price, it is likely that the decision-makers use heuristics 
for evaluating how the situation is likely to continue and base their expectations for the 
longitude of the crisis on this. Several subjects stated that they first thought the downturn 
would pass quickly, but that the expectations were updated due to movements in the 
market and continued low oil prices.  
 
5.3.2 Motivation of survivors 
A couple of firms said that they lost some of the employees they wanted to keep due to 
them looking for other opportunities in the labor market when the sense of job security 
was weakened. This is a sign of downsizing processes affecting job security and which in 
turn can affect turnover. This is probably to a large extent avoided in many cases in this 
industry, as the crisis is industry-wide, which should work in the companies’ favor. One 
small company that had a downsizing process a few years ago did experience some 
poaching of valuable employees from outside the industry in that process, but there does 
not seem to be a transferrable effect present in the current downturn.  
 
Many of the firms tried to counteract insecurity among employees by having a swift 
information process when layoffs were being conducted, so that unnecessary anxiety was 
avoided. This was mentioned as being important for the way the management’s decisions 
were received amongst the employees. One firm mentioned that the employees felt that 
they did not get the right amount of information, which again led to more gossip and 
unrest among the workers. The firms that ensured to get all the necessary information to 
the employees therefore seem to gain better motivation for the continuation.  
 
Many of the firms mentioned that it was important for them to make sure the process 
was done in a proper manner so that it was perceived as just to the remaining employees. 
The criteria for layoffs were therefore widely discussed with labor unions and employee 
representatives in addition to inter-managerially. This seems to be meant to heighten 
understanding and promote a feeling of fairness among the employees. It might be a 
problem that these criteria are developed in a time of crisis and is not something that is 
incorporated into the organization on an everyday basis, as this may reduce the perceived 
fairness of the criteria. One large company could rely on their regular performance 
appraisals for choosing whom to lay off, and this seemed to have helped them in gaining 
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understanding and upholding motivation. The director here said that they had a 
successful process.  
 
The HR director who chose to go against the initial wishes of the CEO, cited earlier, 
argued for this partly for the effect of the department managers involvement on the 
motivation of the retained employees. 
 
“[…] the department manager becomes very visible for everyone. The person in question has the gain 
from this when the following work with the remaining employees begins. […] If you are a leader, you 
have to be a leader in ups and downs. And we will make them strong and prepared to handle the things 
that are similar to a crisis. What we see is that they get a completely different standing in the 
organization, especially when facing the remaining employees.” 
- HR director in large, exploitative firm 
 
One caveat of the reliability of the statements on the motivation of the remaining 
employees is the source of the information. Keeping in mind that the subjects are the 
ones that have carried out the downsizing process within the firm, there is a chance that 
their view of the perceptions of employees are biased. Some of the companies did 
mention some resistance among employees, but this was mostly from the ones that were 
laid off. It is not unlikely that these employees’ feelings transfer to some degree to other, 
retained employees. However, the downturn might dampen the effect of turnover in a 
downsizing process, as there are not many firms hiring, as verbalized by this HR director: 
 
“[we have not lost employees that we want to keep] nearly no one resigns in these times” 
- HR director, large, exploitative firm 
5.3.3 Prospect theory 
Table 12: Prospect Theory Summary, repeated 
 Gains Losses 
High probability Risk averse: chooses to win 
$100 rather than $200x50% 
($180) 
Risk seeking: chooses to lose 
$200x50% ($180) rather than 
$100 
Low probability Risk seeking: chooses to win 
$1000x5% ($50) rather than 
$55 
Risk averse: chooses to lose 
$55 rather than $1000x5% 
($50) 
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When the reference point is continuing with the same human capital stock, downsizing 
can be argued to be both in the domain of loss or gain, depending on the situation of the 
firm. It is in the domain of loss if the firms do not want to lose their employees, but have 
no other choice than to lay off. It can be in the domain of gain if the downsizing leads to 
saved costs or increased efficiency in the organization from getting rid of low-performing 
employees. Whether the probability of loss is high or low depends on the perceived 
length of the crisis. If a firm believes the downturn will last for a long time, the 
probability of high loss is high, whereas if they believe the downturn will end soon, the 
probability of high loss is low. If the probability of high loss is high, the firm will start 
downsizing sooner and to a larger extent than if the probability of high loss is low. Most 
firms interviewed started the downsizing process because they saw no other viable 
option.  
 
Remembering the findings on impact of the crisis, expected length of the downturn and 
that the majority of the companies interviewed make most of their business project-
based, some thought experiments can be initiated. Some of these are expanded below.  
 
1. First, companies that are not highly negatively impacted by the downturn are 
considered. For these firms, the organizational consequences for downsizing in the 
current state of the business cycle are not overwhelming; there is an abundance of 
available labor should the firm need to scale up operations, and because the external 
conditions provide management with a reason for downsizing (or rightsizing). The 
prospect of loss from downsizing is probably marginal, given that the least necessary 
employees are laid off. It can thus be assumed that the firms are in a domain of gain. 
There does seem to be tendencies for this type of behavior in some of the larger firms 
interviewed – several mentioned that the current environment created an opportunity for 
making the firm more efficient and streamlined.  
 
2. If a firm that has been impacted negatively knows that it will not receive any new 
projects in the near future, it is in a domain of loss with certainty when it comes to 
retaining idle employees. They should then be risk seeking, and will layoff many 
employees to cut losses. This seems to fit with the actions of several of the firms that 
have a pessimistic outlook on the future. One firm said that they had already made 
efficient their company before the crisis hit, so they had to cut employees they really 
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wanted to keep due to the downturn. This firm still had some ongoing projects, but the 
basis for revenue has dramatically decreased. They are in a domain of loss with high 
probability, and thus cut many. Other firms tended to use temporary leaves in hope that 
new projects would come, but had to turn to layoffs when the temporary leaves exceeded 
the legal time constraints. They thus postponed the loss, but did not avoid it.   
 
3. A firm that has lost some projects, but still has a lot of employees working on other 
projects, might see the risk of losing another project, or not getting new projects in the 
future, with a probability of so-and-so. If this probability of loss were high, the firm 
would be risk seeking and cut many employees. If the probability of loss were low, the 
firm would be risk averse and keep as many employees as possible. The latter effect is to 
some extent seen in the small companies that have not downsized. They have enough 
projects as of now, but there is a risk that they will not get new work. However, from the 
interviews it seems like the firms believe this risk to be small, and they keep all their 
employees.  
 
4. A firm is struggling, but it may receive a big project in three months with a 5 percent 
probability. By choosing to layoff the people needed for this possible project, there is a 
certain gain from lower costs after the three months of the notice period where salary is 
due. If the project would have been tendered and the company got it, they would have 
gotten a high gain from retaining the people and winning the project. In this situation, 
according to prospect theory, the firm should choose to retain the employees to due to 
the opportunity to win the big project. In the interview sample here, most firms do not 
seem to follow this train of thought. This might be due to a lack of belief that new 
projects will come along, or simply that the financial reserves have been worn out and 
continuing to hope for a new big project is impossible. The firms might not be able to 
make the choices prospect theory predicts due to lack of financial freedom. 
 
As explained in section 5.1.2, for explorative firms the impact of prospects for customer 
firms can also impact the amount of projects the innovative firms win. This perception 
of being in the domain of gain with high probability for a higher gain in turn affects 
decision-making in the explorative firm, because they cannot keep their employees busy.  
The investing firm perceives the decision to be in the domain of gain with high 
probability, and the gain from the innovative solution has a higher expected return. 
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However, due to the prospect of not gaining the higher return, especially in a time with 
an especially low oil price, the innovative solution of the explorative firm will not be 
chosen.   
5.3.4 Contagion effects and herd behavior 
Media  
None of the interviewees said that the media explicitly affects decisions, but some 
suggested that it might affect how they perceive the future, as the expectations for the 
duration of the downturn have changed from earlier. Many firms mentioned that it was 
easier to gain understanding in the organization for why temporary leaves and layoffs are 
happening. This may also be an indicator that some firms use the downturn as a way of 
rightsizing the company, because they see an opportunity for it.  
 
One large firm was adamant that it was crucial for them to not end up in the media due 
to the layoffs, and they tried their best to avoid this in the layoff process. This point was 
also brought up in Dahl and Nesheim’s (1998) study of Norwegian firms in downsizing 
processes – they wish to stay away from the spotlight in such a process. This does then 
seem to impact how the downsizing process is carried out in some of the firms. This can 
be seen by the meticulous way the downsizing process is carried out – these firms try to 
follow rules and regulations precisely to avoid getting negative publicity.  
 
Herd behavior 
None of the interview subjects said that they were affected by what competitors were 
doing. Looking at the industry trends and what the firms interviewed are doing in this 
downturn, it is clear that managers do make very similar decisions. This is expected 
considering the nature of a downturn, but it might also be because very few dare to go 
against the grain and act countercyclical. They all pretty much do the same things, so it is 
hard to decisively say that herd behavior is not present in the sample firms. Also here 
there is a problem when the interview subjects are the ones making the decisions – 
leaders rarely want to admit that they act according to what others are doing. By 
analyzing what the different firms do, there are clear patterns across all sizes and 
strategies – downsizing is prominent. The 60 percent drop in the oil price has seriously 
diminished these firms’ basis for revenue, and it is likely that downsizing is inevitable for 
many of the companies. However, the firms that could be in a position to hire now 
might be worried to do this because so few others are doing it. The company that did 
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this intentionally was family owned and had a very strong CEO/owner, which makes it 
easier for him to go against the herd, as he is in a leadership role in the company and 
only has to answer to himself and his family for why he chooses to make certain 
decisions. 
 
In a downturn, it can be beneficial to act countercyclical, go against the herd, and hire 
talent at a lower price than in a period of high demand for labor. Of the firms 
interviewed that had downsized very few had hired, and most of those who had seemed 
apologetic of it. One firm who had not downsized due to the drop in the oil price was 
exploiting the opportunities that arose in the labor market and was eager regarding the 
larger pool of talent they could choose from. For most of the firms, though, it seems that 
there is not enough demand for them to hire currently.  
 
5.4 Summing up analysis 
Summing up, it seems that the initial perceived impact of the crisis and the following 
outlook on the future impacts the relative size of the downsizing process in the firms, 
with those who are negatively impacted and have a pessimistic outlook downsizing more. 
There seems to be some indication that some firms are using the downturn strategically 
to rid the company of employees that are not performing in the wanted way, ie 
rightsizing. Core employees are in many firms hoarded at the expense of non-core 
employees, as these are vital to the direct business of the firms.  
 
From the analysis it is clear that the firms follow similar decision-making paths and that 
the same type of people are part of the decision-making process. Some smaller firms 
have a stronger influence from the CEO than in other larger firms. There does seem to 
be some differences in where in the organization decisions are made regarding layoffs 
and hiring – which can be generalized to a certain extent for recessions and expansions. 
This indicates that decision-making in downturns is more centralized than in upswings. 
 
It seems like the factors that influence decision-makers beyond the impact on the firm 
and the expectation for the future are organizational and personal experiences, numbers 
and budgets, the want to maintain motivation in the remaining employees and, to a 
certain extent, contagion effects and following the herd, even though the two latter are 
downplayed by the interviewees. In addition, heuristics from assessing the length of the 
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crisis affect the expected longevity of the downturn, which in turn might affect how 
many are laid off. These factors influence human capital investments in the firm.  
 
Having analyzed the most important findings this study, the coming section, Conclusion, 
will sum up how these findings answer the four research questions.  
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6. Conclusion 
The purpose of this study has been to gather data on which employees are laid off in a 
downturn and how the decision-processes surrounding this downsizing unfolds. The 
baseline for this research has been an ongoing project at S T O P at NHH that examines 
and investigates what happens within firms during recessions, headed by Lasse Lien and 
Eirik Knudsen.  
6.1 Main findings 
In this section the main findings are summarized in relation to the research questions. 
The paragraph explaining the thought behind the questions from section 1, Introduction, 
is repeated below for the convenience of the reader.  
 
The first question is meant to uncover which type of employee is laid off in a downturn 
and why these are the ones to be cut. The research in this area expects employees with 
low adjustment costs if new hiring becomes necessary to be laid off first, and it is 
investigated whether this rings true for the firms interviewed. The second question is 
aimed to find which persons are involved in the decision-making process when a 
downturn is ongoing. The third question then follows up on the second question, and 
should be answered with how the actual decision process is carried out when it comes to 
time of involvement and degree of influence from different people in the organization. 
The fourth and final question is meant to supplement the second and third questions by 
looking into which factors impact the main decision-makers in the decision-making 
process.  
6.1.1 Who is laid off in a downturn and why are they chosen? 
In a downturn two main tendencies are that non-core personnel in support functions are 
cut first or that the company downsizes in all departments. From the interviews it 
became clear that there is not a great deal of firm specific knowledge in the labor stock, 
but rather industry specific knowledge. Most employees can easily do a similar job in a 
competing company. The firms that cut administration first likely find that the 
adjustment cost for rehiring such employees are lower than the adjustment costs from 
rehiring core employees. In firms that cut across the board the costs of labor hoarding 
are deemed to be too high considering the expected length of the downturn.  
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When deciding whom to lay off, nearly all of the firms interviewed stated that they 
choose based on four main criteria: formal competence, suitability for the job, seniority 
and other social factors. In addition, many firms also put emphasis on the expected use 
of the employees in the foreseeable future, depending on which type of projects the 
company had and which type of projects it expects to get. This supports the notion that 
core employees are labor hoarded.  
6.1.2 Who is involved in the decision-making process? 
The involved parties in the decision-making vary across differences in firm characteristics 
such as size and the degree of unionized employees. In small firms, there is a smaller 
group in charge of decisions, often mainly the CEO. Except in the small firms 
mentioned, the management team is the driving force for decisions in most companies 
interviewed. In some firms the CEO is the only decision-maker, but mostly there are 
discussions between several managers. In the larger firms with several layers, direct 
managers to the affected employees are usually involved. In companies where labor 
unions are necessary to involve in the decision-making process, these are often consulted 
when the criteria for layoffs are being decided.  
 
Owners are usually not directly involved in the decision-making, except when they are 
part of the management. Some firms mentioned that pressure from the owners forced 
them to initiate cost-saving measures that would not have happened at that time 
otherwise. Employees are rarely involved in the decision-making process at all, save for 
when social criteria are being assessed by managers. In meeting regarding this the 
employee can shed light on aspects that the managers does not necessarily know about 
their private life, and in that sense impact the final decision-making.  
6.1.3 How does the decision-process unfold? 
The decision-making process in a downturn involves problem identification, 
development and evaluation of different solutions. Usually other measures than 
downsizing are initiated first due to management’s hope that the crisis will subdue 
quickly. As the expectations for the future become more pessimistic, the firms turn to 
layoffs. The expectation for the future seems to be partly based on cancellation of 
current or lack of new tendered projects and partly on the decision-makers’ previous 
experiences with fluctuations in the oil price. In addition, what is portrayed in the media 
might adversely impact the expectations the firms have for the future.  
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Partly due to the uncertainty connected to the length of the crisis, the basis on which the 
decision-makers form their decisions is of bounded rationality. It does not necessarily 
have to do with the limited cognitive ability of the decision-makers, but the sheer 
number of different factors in the environment create such an uncertain future that 
decisions are made based on inexact information.  
6.1.4 Which factors influence decision-making? 
The impact of the crisis and the expected length of the downturn are the overarching 
factors that lead to the downsizing process being initiated. Several other factors affecting 
decision-making are prevalent in the firms interviewed. Personal experiences of the 
management team impact how the decisions are made in the companies in different 
ways. Experience-based decisions are widespread. One person changed the layoff 
procedures of the firm, which would not have happened without the previous 
experiences of the person in question. Another stated that he had learned that 
downsizing does not go to plan, and he had the firm adjust the approach to downsizing 
accordingly. Generally, the firms have gone through downsizing before, and they take 
with them experience from earlier and apply it to the current situation.  
 
The decision-making process involves many people and the measures are discussed at 
length. This wide usage of logic and statistics reduces the use of heuristics, but in some 
instances the use of such rules of thumb and common sense occurs. One type of 
heuristic that might be seen in play is experience with difficult times previously. The oil 
price has fluctuated before, and decision-makers take with them knowledge from earlier 
into forming expectations on how long the crisis will last and thus the number of layoffs 
needed to survive until better times. Having a fair and transparent process was important 
to all the firms that downsized, to maintain a good reputation in the industry and to 
make sure remaining employees were motivated for the future. 
 
Lastly, it is clear that the Norwegian Work Environment Act is a major influence on 
decision-making when it comes to layoffs. This is no surprise, as not acting according to 
the law can lead to legal proceedings and layoffs being ruled invalid.  
	   82 
6.2 Limitations 
As mentioned earlier, the qualitative nature of this study makes it difficult to generalize 
the findings. This study only examines firms in the oil and gas industry in Norway. 
Norwegian laws on downsizing are more rigid than in many other countries, and results 
may not be easily transferable to other environments (Dahl & Nesheim, 1998). The study 
has not explored in-depth how the companies with international presence handle 
downsizing in other countries. Due to time limitations only a certain amount of firms 
could be interviewed.  
6.3 Implications 
These results are meant to support and aid the ongoing research at Center for Strategy 
Organization and Performance (S T O P) at NHH. Several papers on how firms’ 
investments change during recessions have been carried out, and this thesis has explored 
areas that had not been studied; how decision-making processes play out in recessions. 
By understanding the decision-making processes surrounding layoffs in a downturn, a 
more rounded understanding for the mechanisms in firms during recessions can be 
obtained.  
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Appendix 
Interview guide 
 
Informasjon som gis før intervjuet starter 
1. Informasjon om masteroppgaven og kort om oss  
2. Informasjon om tema og problemstilling 
3. Kort om hensikten med intervjuet 
4. Informasjon om konfidensialitet og anonymitet 
5. Informasjon om gjennomføring av intervju med henhold til varighet  
6. Spørre om det er ok at vi bruker lydopptaker 
7. Informere om at vedkommende kan velge å la være å svare på spørsmål om 
ønskelig, og intervjuet stoppes dersom respondenten ønsker dette. 
8. Sørge for at alt er klart for respondenten før vi setter i gang 
 
Generelt om intervjuobjektet  
9. Hva er din rolle i bedriften? 
10. Hvor lenge har du vært i bedriften? 
11. Hvilken bakgrunn har du? Har du vært i andre bransjer tidligere? 
12. Hva er viktigst for deg i jobben din? 
 
Del 1: Karakteristika ved bedriften  
13. Hvordan var den økonomiske situasjonen for bedriften før nedgangen i 
oljeprisen? 
a. Var dere inne i en periode med nyansettelser eller nedbemanning? 
b. Bedriftens finansielle stilling før krisen?  
c. Kapasitetsutnyttelse? 
d. Forventninger om fremtiden? 
e. Fokus på FoU? 
f. Hvis utenlandskeid: Mye kontakt med hovedkontoret? 
 
Del 2: Effekter av nedgang 
14. Hvor hardt har dere blitt rammet av nedgangen? 
15. Når merket dere effekten av nedgangen? 
16. På hvilken måte har dere blitt rammet av nedgangen i oljeprisen? 
a. Nedgang i etterspørsel? Mangel på kapital? 
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b. Har dere blitt mindre likvide? 
17. Hvilke tiltak har dere tatt som følge av nedgangen? 
18. Har dere nedbemannet som følge av nedgangen i oljeprisen? 
a. Hvor mange har blitt sagt opp? 
b. Har noen ansatte blitt permittert? Hvor mange? 
c. Hvilke stillinger besitter de som nedbemannes og permitteres? 
19. Har dere mistet ansatte som dere egentlig ønsket å beholde? 
a. Hvordan formidler man avgjørelsen til den ansatte? 
20. Er det noen dere bevisst har beholdt? 
a. Hva kjennetegner disse? 
21. Har dere ansatt nye personer i løpet av perioden?  
a. Hvorfor? Og til hvilke stillinger? 
22. Har dere allokert ansatte med ledig kapasitet til andre 
avdelinger/stillinger/prosjekt som følge av nedgangen?  
a. Hvor mange? Eksempler? Mye utbredt? 
b. (Har dere økt investeringer i opplæring og utviklingsprogram for ansatte? 
c. Hva med organisasjonsutviklingsprogram? ) 
23. Hvilke konsekvenser har nedgangen fått for beslutningene om de ansatte? 
a. Har oljeprisfallet presset dere til å bli mer kortsiktige?  
b. Ville dere gjort noe annerledes om dere hadde større finansielle reserver 
tilgjengelig? 
24. Har forventningene om fremtiden endret seg? 
a. Hvilke forventninger har dere til varigheten av oljeprisnedgangen? 
 
Del 3: Beslutninger og beslutningsprosessen om de ansatte under resesjoner 
25. Hvor i bedriften blir beslutninger om de ansatte tatt, og hvem er inkludert i 
beslutningsprosessen? Hvordan varierer dette ved ulike typer nedbemanning, 
ulike deler av organisasjonen? 
a. Oppsigelser/permitteringer? 
b. (Er beslutningsmyndigheten sentralisert eller desentralisert?) 
c. Kan de ulike avdelingene påvirke denne prosessen?  
d. Hvem tar initiativ til og setter i gang prosessen? 
e. På bakgrunn av hvilke kriterier blir beslutningen tatt? (kompetanse, osv..) 
f. På bakgrunn av hvilken informasjon?  
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g. Hvor stor kjennskap har de som tar beslutningene til de ansatte som 
beslutningene omhandler? 
26. Er det fokus på å beholde de dyktigste eller si opp de som ikke er strengt 
nødvendige? 
 
27. Følger beslutningsprosessen en fast prosedyre og/eller faste kriterier? 
a. Hvem har utarbeidet denne prosedyren/disse kriteriene? 
b. Finnes det prosedyrer som sikrer at ledere ikke må si opp ansatte de 
kjenner? 
c. Finnes det prosedyrer som sikrer at de som tar beslutningene ikke lar seg 
påvirke av følelser/skjønn/vennskap/egeninteresse? 
28. Evaluerer dere beslutningsprosessen og beslutningene som tas? 
a. Opplever du at beslutningsprosessen gjennomføres på en tilfredsstillende 
måte? (Hvorfor/hvorfor ikke?) 
29. Er beslutningsprosessen forskjellig mellom ansettelser og oppsigelser? 
30. Var disse prosessene annerledes før nedgangsperioden? 
31. Blir det ansatt og sagt opp i samme avdeling? 
a. Hvordan legitimeres det? 
32. Når beslutninger om oppsigelser er tatt, hvordan informeres de ansatte? 
33. Har du tatt avgjørelser om hvem som skal sies opp? 
a. Hvordan foretrekker du å informere dem? 
 
Erfaring fra tidligere 
34. Har erfaringer fra tidligere kriser påvirket beslutninger og håndtering av denne 
nedgangen? 
 
Del 4: Bedriftens omgivelser 
 
Maktforhold i bransjen 
35. Baseres beslutninger på hva andre aktører i bransjen gjør/ønsker? Hvordan? 
a. Kunder, leverandører, konkurrenter  
36. Hvordan er konkurransesituasjonen for din bedrift? 
a. Er det mange som utfører de samme aktivitetene? 
b. Er det mange som leverer de samme produktene/tjenestene? 
37. Opplever dere at andre aktører er avhengige av deres bedrift?  
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38. Vil nedbemanninger kunne gå utover kvaliteten på produktene og tjenestene dere 
leverer? 
a. Hvordan jobber dere for å unngå dette? 
 
Fagforeninger 
39. Hvor mange av de ansatte i din bedrift er organisert i fagforeninger? 
a. Er det én fagforening som står spesielt sterkt i deres bedrift? 
40. Har fagforeningene innflytelse i nedbemanningsprosessen? 
a. I hvilken grad og på hvilken måte? 
b. Hva er fagforeningens viktigste interesse? 
c. Har fagforeningenene noe å si for hvem som må gå og hvem som får bli? 
d. Ansiennitetsprinsippet?  
41. Samsvarer interessene til fagforeningen(e) og bedriften?  
a. Ville dere tatt andre beslutninger dersom fagforeningene var mindre 
tilstedeværende? 
b. Etterkommer bedriften krav fra fagforeningene som går på bekostning av 
andre mål for bedriften?  
c. Fører motstand fra fagforeningene til at dere bruker lenger tid på å fatte 
beslutninger om de ansatte? 
42. Opplever dere at fagforeningene er mer/mindre villige enn før nedgangen?  
 
Del 5: Bedriftens interne forhold 
 
Organisasjonsstruktur 
43. Hvilken organisasjonsstruktur har bedriften?  
a. Er de ulike divisjonene klart separerte fra hverandre? 
44. Består bedriften av flere enheter med geografisk spredning? 
a. Hvor er hovedkontoret? Hvilke funksjoner og arbeidsoppgaver 
gjennomføres av hovedkontoret? 
b. Er de ulike enhetene like store/mektige/innflytelsesrike? 
45. Hvordan påvirker organisasjonsstrukturen beslutningsprosessen? 
 
Organisasjonskultur 
46. Hvordan vil du beskrive bedriftens organisasjonskultur? 
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a. Har bedriften definerte verdier og normer? 
b. Opplever du at det eksisterer uskrevne normer og praksiser i bedriften 
som påvirker de ansattes handlinger og holdninger? 
47. Får nyansatte i bedriften opplæring i bedriftens historie og verdier? 
48. I hvilken grad har bedriften møtt motstand fra ansatte ved omstillingen som 
følge av oljeprisnedgangen? 
49. I hvilken grad er de ansatte involvert i omstillingsprosessen? 
a. Har ansatte mulighet til å komme med innspill?  
b. Har de noen form for innflytelse over beslutningene? 
 
Myndigheter 
50. Har det blitt mer gunstig for bedriften å permittere enn å si opp ansatte som 
følge av de nye permitteringsreglene? 
a. Får dette noen konsekvenser i deres bedrift? Blir flere permittert enn 
tidligere? 
51. Opplever dere at lovgivningen om oppsigelser og permittering er rimelig? 
a. Ville mer gunstige permitteringsregler ført til færre oppsigelser? 
52. Hvilke forventninger har dere til at myndighetene iverksetter støttende tiltak som 
følge av nedgangen i oljebransjen?  
a. Hvilke tiltak mener dere i så fall at myndighetene burde iverksette? 
 
Samfunnsansvar 
53. På hvilken måte ivaretar dere CSR? 
a. Markedsfører dere samfunnsansvar som noe som er viktig for bedriften? 
b. Er deres fokus på samfunnsansvar synlig for publikum?   
54. Har CSR-hensyn påvirket beslutningsprosessene om de ansatte? Hvordan? 
a. Lokalsamfunn... 
55. Opplever dere at omgivelsene har forventninger til hvilke beslutninger dere bør 
ta om de ansatte? 
a. Hvilke forventninger har omgivelsene? 
b. Tar dere hensyn til disse forventningene? 
c. Har det blitt lettere å nedbemanne etterhvert som flere bedrifter har 
nedbemannet? 
d. Dersom man ser at konkurrenter ansetter, reevaluerer man da sin taktikk? 
56. Har medieoppslag om nedgangen påvirkning på hvordan dere handler? 
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57. Har (potensielle) medieoppslag noen innflytelse over hva bedriften gjør med de 
ansatte? 
a. Medieoppslag om bedriften 
 
Helse, miljø og sikkerhet 
58. Har dere en egen HMS-avdeling? 
a. Hvor mange er ansatt der? 
b. Dersom ikke HMS-avdeling: hvem jobber med HMS? 
59. Har HMS-hensyn påvirket beslutninger om de ansatte? 
a. Hvordan? 
60. Har det blitt/vil det bli gjort nedbemanninger av ansatte som jobber innenfor 
HMS? 
 
Avsluttende spørsmål 
61. Er det noe du vil tilføye som berører de temaene vi har vært innom? 
62. Kan vi kontakte deg ved en senere anledning om vi skulle behøve mer 
informasjon? 
63. TUSEN TAKK FOR HJELPEN 
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Email to companies 
Hei  
Takk for hyggelig samtale i dag! Jeg sender som lovet en oppfølgingsmail. 
Intervjuet vil ta mellom 45 minutter og en time. All informasjon som fremkommer av 
intervjuet vil bli holdt konfidensielt, og informasjonen vil bli slettet med en gang 
prosjektet er ferdigstilt.  
Litt info om prosjektet: 
Jeg er en masterstudent ved NHH som arbeider som forskningsassistent i forbindelse 
med min masteroppgave ved Center for Strategy, Organization and Performance (S T O 
P) ved NHH. Forskningsprosjektet utføres i tett samarbeid med professor Lasse B. Lien 
og førsteamanuensis Eirik Sjåholm Knudsen.  
Tema for prosjektet knytter seg til oljeprisfallet høsten 2014, som skapte en rekke 
utfordringer for bedrifter i norsk olje- og gassektor. En av disse utfordringene knytter seg 
til hva bedrifter velger å gjøre med de ansatte under vanskelige perioder. Vi ønsker å se 
nærmere på hvordan denne utfordringen håndteres, og hvordan dette varierer mellom 
ulike bedrifter.  
Formålet med forskningsprosjektet er å kartlegge sammenhengene mellom 
nedgangsperioden og tiltak bedriftene iverksetter, for videre å kunne studere hvordan 
dette påvirker bedrifters konkurranseevne på kort og lang sikt. Dette vil kunne bidra til å 
gjøre bedrifter bedre rustet ved fremtidige nedgangstider.  
Ta gjerne kontakt dersom du har noen spørsmål. 
 
Med vennlig hilsen  
Karen Kristin Wie 
 
